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Abstract 
Department of Defense (DoD) software-intensive systems and the software 
content in other systems will continue to grow and may dominate total ownership 
costs (TOC) in the future.  These costs are exacerbated by the fact that, in addition 
to contracted development costs, the bulk of software sustainment costs are also 
contracted.  All of these factors indicate that DoD system software will continue to be 
a very expensive portion of TOC. 
The software engineering environment remains immature, with few, if any, 
industry-wide standards for software development or sustainment.  The Defense 
Acquisition System (DAS) is significantly dependent on mature engineering. 
System software size and complexity are key indicators of both development 
costs and sustainment costs, so initial estimates are critical for predicting and 
controlling TOC.  Unfortunately, the software size estimating processes require a 
significant amount of detailed understanding of the requirements and design that is 
typically not available when operating the DAS without supplementary analyses, 
tools, and techniques.  Available parametric estimating tools require much of the 
same detailed information and are still too inaccurate to be relied upon.  Similarly, 
understanding the potential software complexity requires in-depth understanding of 
the requirements and architectural design. 
It is clear that the DoD must conduct much more thorough requirements 
analyses, provide significantly more detailed operational context, and drive the 
software architectural design well beyond the work breakdown structure (WBS) 
functional design typically provided.  To accomplish this, the DAS must be 
supplemented with tools, techniques, and analyses that are currently not present. 
Program managers for software-intensive systems must supplement the DAS 
processes to 
• compensate for the immature software engineering environment 
• gain sufficient detailed information to perform reasonable software size and 
complexity estimates critical to understanding and managing system TOC 
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    Naval Postgraduate School 
• complete the inventory of derived and implied requirements, including the 
often neglected sustainability requirements, before the request for proposal 
(RFP) is issued 
• provide more detailed system operational context, beyond what exists in 
most Operational Mode Summary/Mission Profile documents 
• obtain more realistic contractor proposals in terms of cost and schedule 
associated with the software development and sustainment 
• drive the software architecture for a more sustainable, less complex design 
• monitor the software design process (metrics) to ensure the effort is 
progressing towards an effective, supportable, and testable design 
supporting the warfighter 
The tools, techniques, and analyses presented in this research are designed 
to accomplish the tasks outlined above and are compatible with the Systems 
Engineering Process supporting the DAS.  They also are designed to work together 
in a synergistic method to improve the software-intensive system development and 
sustainment performance influencing system TOC.  Combined, the tools, 
techniques, and analyses provide a much improved understanding of the system 
and identify critical attributes that the software developers need to know to design an 
effective and supportable design.  These tools help compensate for the immature 
software engineering environment, provide more detailed information needed to 
perform size and complexity estimates, and provide detailed operational context 
needed for proper software architectural design.  They help produce superior RFPs 
and garner more realistic contractor proposals.  They provide processes for 
monitoring critical software design activities and full test matrix crosswalks.  All of 
these enhancements will help more accurately estimate and manage software TOC 
attributes. 
Keywords:  Total ownership cost (TOC), software, operating & support cost, 
sustainment cost, developmental cost, production cost, software supportability, post 
deployment software support (PDSS)  
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Background 
Significant technological advancements tend to have dramatic impacts on 
systems’ life-cycle costs, sometimes reducing development and sustainment costs, 
and other times increasing those costs.  For example, the development of electronic 
relays to replace physical relays vastly increased the maintenance and replacement 
intervals for systems so equipped.  The resulting sustainment cost savings were 
significant.  The advancements can have the opposite effect, as evidenced by the 
stealth aircraft coatings, which are difficult and costly to maintain: 
After a stealth aircraft flies, maintenance workers must recoat the skin 
repairing the tiny dings and burrs that increase the craft’s radar 
signature.  … The B-2’s skin is so sensitive that maintenance on the 
plane must be carried out in environment-controlled hangars that 
currently exist only at Whiteman Air Force Base.  The B-2’s that 
participated in the Kosovo campaign thus had to fly more than 30 
hours round-trip between Missouri and Yugoslavia.  It then generally 
took from four to seven days to get them ready to return to combat. 
(Silverstein & Moag, 2000, p. 1) 
Weapon system software functionality is another of those significant 
technological advancements and is changing the nature of a software-intensive 
system’s total ownership cost (TOC).  Understanding and influencing software 
developmental and sustainment costs is critical in predicting and controlling weapon 
system TOC in a fiscally constrained environment.  Somewhere in the range of 85% 
to 90% of the F-22 Raptor’s functions are wholly or partially software-controlled, and 
this trend is likely to continue through future weapon system development efforts. 
This research is a continuation of TOC research efforts conducted by the 
Naval Postgraduate School Acquisition Research Program, and the focus of this 
effort is specifically exploring software sustainment effects on a software-intensive 
system TOC.  It is no secret that Department of Defense (DoD) weapon systems 
have leveraged the advantages of software-controlled functions and that the amount 
of software has continually and radically increased, as indicated in Figure 1.   
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Figure 1. Software Functions and Lines of Code 
(NAVAIR and U.S. Army CECOM Brief, 2012, p. 5) 
Clearly, the DoD’s desire for ever-increasing software-intensive systems will 
continue.  In addition to the desired software-intensive weapon systems, tactical and 
strategic networks have only just begun to be developed, driving the amount of 
software in the DoD to unprecedented levels.  What are the implications of software 
on development and sustainment costs?  Is software different with regard to 
development?  Is software sustainment different? 
The cost of software development is not trivial, but like hardware-centric 
systems, 60–80% of the software life-cycle costs are typically incurred in the 
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sustainment phase, so software sustainment becomes a very important 
consideration when attempting to reduce the weapon systems’ TOC.   
Definitions (Boudreau & Naegle, 2003, p. 1) 
Total ownership cost (TOC) has two definitions; the first is very broad, looking 
from the DoD or Service perspective.   
DoD TOC is the sum of all financial resources necessary to organize, 
equip, train, sustain, and operate military forces sufficient to meet 
national goals in compliance with all laws, all policies applicable to 
DoD, all standards in effect for readiness, safety, and quality of life, 
and all other official measures of performance for DoD and its 
Components.  DoD TOC is comprised of costs to research, develop, 
acquire, own, operate, and dispose of weapon and support systems, 
other equipment and real property, the costs to recruit, train, retain, 
separate and otherwise support military and civilian personnel, and all 
other costs of business operations of the DoD. (Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics [USD(AT&L)], 
1998, p.5 ) 
The second definition is deliberately written from the vantage point of the 
program manager (PM) of the warfighting system. 
Defense Systems TOC is defined as Life Cycle Cost (LCC). LCC (per 
DoD 5000.4M) includes not only acquisition program direct costs, but 
also the indirect costs attributable to the acquisition program (i.e., costs 
that would not occur if the program did not exist). For example, indirect 
costs would include the infrastructure that plans, manages, and 
executes a program over its full life and common support items and 
systems.  The responsibility of program managers in support of 
reducing DoD TOC is the continuous reduction of LCC for their 
systems. (USD[AT&L], 1998, p. 2) 
As Dr. Gansler said in his 1998 memorandum from which the above 
definitions were extracted, the PM’s job in trying to reduce TOC is a very difficult 
one, and PMs should seek help wherever they can to reduce ownership costs.  
Because of the extreme amount of focus on the authorized and appropriated budget, 
it is easy for PMs to likewise focus on the near-term acquisition cost and make 
decisions that appear to be beneficial in reducing acquisition costs but that are 
detrimental to operations and support costs because they increase future budgets.  
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For example, if a program experiences a budget cut, which is a very typical 
occurrence, there is significant pressure to continue to deliver the same number of 
new systems, even though there has been a cut in funding.  As a result, the PM 
looks for something else to cut out of the program.  Logistics performance items are 
rarely deemed to be key performance parameters (KPPs), so they become easy 
targets for cutting during budget cut drills.  So the PM is faced with a choice: Cut the 
number of systems to be acquired or reduce the logistics performance (eliminate 
built-in test [BIT] capability, onboard diagnostics/prognostics/autonomics, etc.), 
which will add significant operating and support (O&S) costs well after the PM has 
moved to a different position.  Which choice do you suppose is most appealing to 
the PM? 
Even the definition of system is changing as we move to system-of-systems 
(SoS) and net-centric system concepts.  For example, developing the Single 
Integrated Air Picture (SIAP) as a system means that all the Services’ manned and 
unmanned aircraft, many guided and unguided missile platforms, and a host of 
command and control systems are now at least a part of SIAP.  Changes to any of 
the platforms (especially software changes) could result in changes to others, 
impacting the TOC of the individual weapon platforms and of the SIAP system.  How 
do we account for SoS or net-centric system-driven changes/maintenance in 
forecasting or even attributing cost elements?  For example, consider the networking 
software for Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) as updated for 
the M1 Main Battle Tank and several other platforms using the network.  The 
software update did not integrate perfectly with the M1’s onboard software suite, 
causing uncommanded turret movement (Federation of American Scientists [FAS], 
2011a).  Because the other platforms in the system did not experience 
interoperability problems, the PM for M1 was assigned responsibility for the 
diagnosis and repair of M1 software to be compatible with the FBCB2 update.  This 
begs the questions of which program should the TOC expense be attributed to 
(FBCB2 or M1), how would such TOC factors be forecasted, and who would budget 
for them? 
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TOC Processes: CAIV and R-TOC (Boudreau & Naegle, 2003, p. 2) 
Pursuit of TOC reduction at the level of the warfighting system may be 
separated into two major approaches that are connected, end-to-end, along a life-
cycle time line.  During the developmental phases, the effort or process is called 
Cost As an Independent Variable (CAIV).  For systems in the field or fleet, the 
process or goal becomes Reduction of Total Ownership Cost (R-TOC).  The chart in 
Figure 2 is a typical depiction of the CAIV/R-TOC relationship. 
  
Figure 2. CAIV/R-TOC Relationship  
(Kaye, Sobota, Graham, & Gotwald, 2000, p. 354) 
The first approach, CAIV, addresses TOC during the warfighting system’s 
developmental phases, beginning with the Concept Refinement phase.  The focus of 
CAIV is to establish cost targets based on affordability and requirements and then to 
manage to those targets, thereby controlling TOC.  CAIV includes consideration of 
costs for development, production, operations and support, and disposal.  An 
example of the CAIV process would be to set specific cost and reliability targets for 
each subsystem or component of a weapon system in development such that the 
warfighting system would be able to achieve the required operational availability (AO) 
at the specified cost.  
Employing the CAIV concept early in the developmental process offers, 
potentially, the greatest opportunity for TOC reduction at the lowest possible 
investment cost.  As an example, the TOC impact of using two different power plants 
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presents an opportunity to use the CAIV evaluation technique to estimate the TOC 
impact and make a best-value decision.  For illustrative purposes, consider a 
standard internal combustion engine at a cost of $7,500 versus a hybrid-electric 
power plant costing $19,000.  The impact to the acquisition cost is evident, but it 
excludes the cost savings associated with fuel consumption over the life of the 
system.  If the system’s operational mode indicates an average usage of 15,000 
miles per year and an economic useful life (EUL) of 20 years, the total miles 
expected would be 300,000.  If the standard engine in our comparison is estimated 
at 10 miles per gallon and the hybrid engine is estimated at 25 miles per gallon, the 
estimated fuel saved by the hybrid-powered system would be 18,000 gallons.  At a 
current estimate of $1.25 per gallon, the operating and support impact is $22,500 
per system (TOC improvement: $11,000 less expensive than the standard engine), 
and there are other reductions in fuel supply assets and attendant personnel that 
apply. 
The second approach to TOC is the R-TOC, which focuses on the reduction 
of average procurement unit cost (APUC) and weapon system sustainment cost 
(i.e., O&S costs).  R-TOC is employed as the warfighting system is produced and 
placed in service.  Examples of R-TOC would be a value engineering change 
proposal (VECP) to reduce the cost of manufacturing a component by improving the 
process yield (the percentage of the manufactured items that are defect free) or a 
VECP to reduce the operating and support cost by improving the reliability of an 
expensive subsystem or component.  Often there are the secondary benefits of 
enhanced performance (i.e., improved reliability and operational availability), but the 
forcing function is the reduction of operating and support costs, the largest 
constituent of TOC. 
System software has become an ever-increasing TOC driver as more 
systems rely on software functions.  
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TOC Obstacles (Boudreau & Naegle, 2003, pp. 4–7) 
Someone who is not involved with program management might wonder what 
is especially difficult about containing and controlling TOC.  In truth, there are many 
difficulties.  What follows is a description of some of the obstacles that get in the way 
of controlling or reducing weapon system TOC.  All of these obstacles are well 
known but are entrenched and difficult to overcome.  
The competing interests of users, developers, prime contractors, 
subcontractors, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Service headquarters, 
maintainers, buying commands, and Congress may negatively impact TOC.  The 
“user” who establishes requirements for a new system may be transfixed by the 
technical performance and may not clearly establish requirements for ownership 
cost to achieve specified system availability.  Materiel developers may be too 
focused on acquisition cost and schedule (a typical complaint from the user 
community) and may ignore future logistics support issues.  Prime contractors may 
concentrate on production costs, with less regard for system sustainment costs, 
particularly if their contract directs them toward reduction in production costs or if 
they sense that their customer is not interested in sustainment issues.  The OSD 
and Service headquarters may encourage poor TOC decisions through funding 
instability and failure to demand life-cycle affordable solutions.  Maintainers may 
contribute to poor R-TOC by failing to speak out loudly on lessons learned from 
previous systems.  Buying commands may contribute to increased ownership costs 
by failing to look aggressively for cost drivers that need to be redesigned for lower 
cost of operation and improved reliability.  Congress may restrict R-TOC by 
constraining the choices of cost-effective sustainment approaches. 
Balancing Total Ownership Cost Goals That Are Conflicting. Successful 
program management includes the ability to achieve balance within a program.  
Indeed, PMs are directed by DoD Directive (DoDD) 5000.1 to manage their 
programs in a balanced way (USD[AT&L], 2003, Encl. 1, para. E1.29). Facets and 
perspectives that need to be balanced are manifold.  Four elements of TOC that 
require balancing are development costs, procurement costs, operating and support 
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costs, and disposal costs.  Development costs, the expenditure of resources during 
system development, may pay off in terms of reduced production and/or sustainment 
costs; producibility studies may save significant manufacturing costs; and reliability 
testing early in a program may allow for avoidance of sustainment costs over the 
service life of the weapon system.  Occasionally, procurement or production cost 
constraints may conflict with sustainment cost targets; for example, heavy pressure 
to reduce production costs may lead to the selection of components that are 
inexpensive but not reliable.  Such choices would reduce production cost but 
increase sustainment costs and very possibly result in an increase of TOC.  When 
such cost goals conflict, a reasonable metric for maintaining balance would appear 
to be minimization of TOC (i.e., life-cycle cost, but often TOC is sub-optimized due to 
these competing pressures).  
Balancing Cost, Schedule, System Performance, Sustainment, Quality, and 
Risk. In the same way that ownership cost goals must be balanced and harmonized, 
system solutions must be found that balance TOC against procurement cost goals, 
program schedule goals, system technical performance, equipment quality, 
supportability performance, and availability. 
The DoD is relying on sophisticated, software-intensive systems to improve 
survivability and lethality, but software is susceptible to high TOC.  Software 
“maintenance” is becoming a major TOC driver (Naegle, 2004, p. 1).  Software is 
difficult to accurately estimate and sensitive to changing requirements. Its 
complexity, interface requirements, and relative ease in adding capability also tend 
to make it maintenance intensive (Humphrey, 1990, ch. 4).  Software’s negative 
influence on TOC is exacerbated by the fact that software support is most often 
provided by contractors, with very little opportunity to move software support to 
Government sources.  For example, the 1980s vintage B1B Bomber budgets were 
approximately $100 million annually for software maintenance, and the 2010 budget 
was $227 million because several software-intensive systems were also being 
upgraded (Naegle & Petross, 2010, p. 25).  The B1’s software support is achieved 
through both contractor and Government software support organizations and is 
coordinated by an Air Force–supported Program Management Office (PMO).  
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During each life-cycle phase, the approach to TOC reduction and the 
methodology may change somewhat, while ownership cost goals and targets 
become more refined.  For example, trade-off processes used in the Materiel 
Solution Analysis phase may be beneficial during that phase but may be inadequate 
for the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase without the 
inclusion of specific contractor incentives. 
Materiel Developer Instability. Key members of the materiel developer team 
change over time.  For example, the PM during the Integrated System Design phase 
would be unlikely to remain in that position through the Production and Deployment 
phase. As key personnel—PMs, chief engineers, product support managers, 
business-financial managers—change, program emphasis shifts, at least subtly.  
These personnel changes, which are a fact of life, may reflect in program missteps, 
including missed TOC targets. 
Funding Instability. Resources tend to be unstable and subject to 
unanticipated, unexpected changes.  Funding instability is also a fact of life in 
Government acquisition programs.  Each time that funding is cut from a program, 
decision-makers adjust the program by postponing or eliminating some activity or 
system attribute.  Decisions are made that will keep the program viable, and often 
the choice is to omit a system feature or a near-term activity that will reflect 
negatively on TOC—but not until later.  Easing back on O&S cost targets is a 
tempting sacrifice when program funding gets cut.  For example, reliability-centered 
maintenance studies cut to reduce cost during EMD would not affect the program 
noticeably until later on, when operational systems are in the field or fleet; the 
associated effect on TOC might be substantial.  Eliminating onboard 
diagnostics/prognostics would certainly help meet funding cuts during the 
Procurement phase, but would likely be extremely costly in terms of maintainer 
training, diagnostics time, erroneous fault isolation, errant parts ordering, and 
associated maintenance man-hours for the life of the system. 
Sticker Shock. The fact that a system’s TOC “price tag” is extremely high 
when compared to its contract unit price may tend to keep stakeholders from 
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discussing TOC in any open forum, fearing that “sticker shock” might cause an 
adverse reaction from a decision-maker or politically powerful individual accustomed 
to seeing much lower cost figures.  As an example, consider a system with an 
average procurement unit cost (APUC) of $1.5 million and a program acquisition 
cost of $2 million.1  Typically, program acquisition cost would represent only about 
28% of each individual system’s TOC, with the remaining 72% representing O&S 
and disposal costs of about $5 million, for a TOC of $7 million per each weapon 
system.  With an acquisition objective of 2,000 systems, the total procurement cost 
would be $3 billion, with a TOC estimate of approximately $14 billion.  If unfamiliar 
with TOC estimates and without a readily available basis for comparison, a decision-
maker might mistakenly conclude that the system would be unaffordable and cancel 
the program.  Concern for such a scenario may create an impediment to widespread 
use of system life-cycle cost numbers, which would have the effect of refocusing 
decisions onto the acquisition “price tag,” not the TOC “price tag.” 
Management of TOC  
There is an increasing body of knowledge related to the control of TOC.  In 
addition to specific congressional direction and ever more detailed DoD direction, 
very thoughtful articles have been published on the matter. Every PM tries different 
approaches to reduce costs.  Additionally, commercial best practices have been 
recognized and suggested for use within the DoD (e.g., GAO-03-57 [GAO, 2003] in 
its entirety). 
  
                                            
1 APUC is the total procurement cost divided by the total procurement quantity.  Program acquisition 
cost includes APUC, facilities, RDT&E, and other procurement costs.  These terms are discussed in 
more detail, later in this research. 
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The Focus of This Paper—Software Development 
and Sustainment Impacts on TOC 
Purpose 
The purpose of this research is to examine DoD software development 
techniques to illustrate the impacts to sustainment costs, which is the main 
contributor to a system’s TOC.  The research also suggests tools, techniques, and 
analyses to assist PMs and others in addressing software-related TOC elements 
more effectively. 
Scope of This Study 
This study examines TOC from the perspective of software development 
management, the perspective of PM execution, and the perspective of available 
infrastructure support. 
Introduction 
This report extends NPS research that was published in 2003 and 2011.  The 
DoD initiatives on weapon system TOC is available on two websites: 
Much of the TOC and Reduction in TOC (R-TOC) efforts were 
captured in initiatives collected and shared on a TOC website 
maintained by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA; www.ida.org).  
The DAU Acquisition Community Connection website 
(https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=22509&lang=en-US) 
also contains useful approaches to TOC and R-TOC. (Naegle & 
Boudreau, 2011)   
Curiously, with all of the efforts to reduce TOC, there is little reference to reducing 
the software contribution to system TOC despite the fact that software functionality 
and software source lines of code (SLOC) continue to increase. 
Software-related sustainment costs have been growing along with the 
growing amount of software developed for weapon systems.  In addition to the 
software size (SLOC count), other factors can influence the system’s supportability 
costs including architectural complexity, external interfaces, the engineering and 
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developmental discipline maintained.  The bar chart in Figure 3 depicts the software 
sustainment growth that the DoD is experiencing, though the leveling after 2015 
seems suspect.  With the explosive software growth depicted in Figure 1 expected to 
continue, the resulting software maintenance costs will likely continue to grow. 
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Figure 3. DoD Software Sustainment Growth 
(Reynolds et al., 2012, p. 6) 
The acquisition reforms initiated in the 1990s fundamentally changed how the 
DoD developed and procured its weapon systems.  At the time, DoD weapon 
systems were hardware-oriented, and software was just beginning to be an 
important system development issue.  A system’s TOC performance is significantly 
defined during the developmental process, and these acquisition reforms had a 
dramatic effect—positive and negative—on TOC.  The central idea behind the 
acquisition reforms was for the Government to become less prescriptive in the 
development of its weapon systems and to garner more innovation from industry.  















 2010   2011   2012   2013   2014   2015   2016   2017   2018 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 13 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
acquisition programs have reduced their preparation for sustainment.  
MIL-STD-1388-2A and -2B, which became obsolete under the 
Acquisition Reform initiatives of the 1990s, were very detailed and for 
many years had guided acquisition logistics planning; they were 
mandatory until circa 1995.2  These standards governed supportability 
analyses and served to inform sustainment planning, but they were 
onerous requirements and sometimes resulted in analyses that 
languished on the shelf and were never put to use. (Naegle & 
Boudreau, 2011, p. 15) 
Transitioning from the military standard (MIL-STD)–based detailed 
specifications to the performance specifications essentially shifted the design 
priorities from the Government to the contractor, including those designs that 
critically impact TOC.  The Government now had the opportunity to specify TOC 
performance, and implemented this ability with mixed results.  For example, the F/A 
18 Super Hornet aircraft uses F404 engines, which “connect to the airframe at only 
10 points and can be replaced without special equipment, a four-person team can 
remove the engine in only 20 minutes” (“F/A 18,” n.d.)  Specifying TOC performance 
elements—in this example, the mean-time-to-repair (MTTR), which drove the F/A 18 
design to accommodate the 20-minute removal time—creates the opportunity to 
improve TOC performance and leverage innovative techniques developed within 
industry.  The downside is that the onus is on the Government to specify desired 
TOC performance or accept the TOC performance deemed appropriate by the 
contractor. 
In 2003, the DoD user community also transformed how the warfighters 
communicate their requirements to the acquisition community.  The Joint 
Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS), as indicated by its name, is a 
capabilities-based requirements development and communication platform, which 
does not focus on any particular solution for satisfying the identified capability need.  
                                            
2 In the mid-1990s, there were numerous acquisition reform initiatives intended to streamline 
acquisition processes and reduce cost.  One of these initiatives was “specs and standards” reform.  
Many Government specs were rescinded to reduce the Government burden and cost of maintaining 
specs; in many cases, the Government switched to commercial specifications that were maintained 
by various technical societies or associations.  Other mandatory specs were rescinded because they 
were thought unnecessary or provided insufficient benefit for the cost expended. MIL-STD 1388-2A 
and -2B were thought by some to fall into the latter category. 
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For example, an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) requirement may be presented 
in language such as “The U.S. Marine Corps has a need for a man-portable anti-
aircraft capability for effectively engaging low-flying aircraft.”  If it is determined that a 
materiel solution is required, a Capabilities Design Document (CDD) is produced 
containing design cues such as “The anti-aircraft system must be supportable within 
the existing USMC personnel and logistics structure.”  Typically, these capabilities-
based requirements need significant interpretation to convert them to Performance 
Specification language.  This interpretation includes the formulation of derived 
requirements; for instance, the “man-portable” capability derives into a weight 
limitation performance specification.  More difficult yet, the capabilities-based 
language creates implied requirements.  To develop a system “supportable within 
the existing USMC personnel and logistics structure” implies that no new personnel 
specialties are needed and that the new system can use existing storage and 
ammunition supply chains. 
The system requirements’ operational context provided for the potential 
contractors is usually communicated through an Operational Mode 
Summary/Mission Profile (OMS/MP).  The typical OMS/MP provides some important 
design cues, but like the performance-based requirements, depends on a very 
mature engineering environment to fill in the gaps and address the inherent 
vagueness in which the OMS/MP are prepared.   
The OMS/MP provides some basic insight into the operational profile, threat 
profile, environmental profile, and the terrain/sea state/undersea/air environment 
profile, which adds some context to the requirements, but is not usually scenario 
based. It typically lacks sustainability activities, interoperability profiles, system life-
cycle profiles, planned or anticipated upgrades, or operation in stressful, degraded, 
or emergency situations. 
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The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), replacing the High Mobility Multi-
purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) family of vehicles, is a multi-mission platform. 
The JLTV program OMS/MP (version 3.3) dated January 12, 2012, paragraph 1.2, 
Document Overview, explains what the JLTV OMS/MP defines, including 
• Expected operational modes 
• Full spectrum operations, operational themes, and elements of the 
operational terms (offense, defense, and stability) 
• Joint mission profiles and operational elements 
• Terrain conditions in terms of mileage, speed, and roughness 
• Environmental conditions (DoD, 2012, p. 3)  
Obviously, a significant amount of mission and system information is omitted. 
The details regarding the following items are not provided: 
• System mission configuration (JLTV is a multi-mission platform) 
• Number of personnel 
• Personnel equipment and supplies required 
• Cargo/hauling capacity 
• Interoperability requirements 
o Communications and network equipment 
o Situational awareness systems 
o Weapons 
o Trailers/towed systems 
o Special missions equipment (e.g., chemical weapons detection) 
o Electric power requirements for integrated equipment 
• Crew maintenance tasks and frequency 
• Survivability considerations 
As with this JLTV OMS/MP, the documents typically do not provide much 
information on operations under stressful, degraded, or unusual conditions, which 
would provide critical design cues for the software engineers. There is no 
prioritization of the operational modes or configurations, nor identification of critical 
and non-critical systems.  
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The software development team would likely continue to be missing important 
information that they need to adequately design the software and to predict the 
funding and schedule resources necessary to build the software the warfighter 
expects. The JLTV OMS/MP was specifically created for the Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase. In paragraph 1.1, Purpose, it states,  
This OMS/MP describes system modes, mission profiles, and usage 
conditions for the JLTV during its operating life. When approved, it 
supersedes the OMS/MP published with the JLTV Request for 
Proposal (RFP) in February 2008, but will not take effect until JLTV 
EMD phase activities. The OMS/MP supports the basis for essential 
capabilities described in the JLTV Capability Development Document 
(CDD) documenting key usage factors directly applicable to design 
study, logistical analyses, O&S [operations and support] estimation, 
and reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM) testing and 
analyses. (DoD, 2012, p. 3) 
It is clear that the typical OMS/MP provided to the contractor is a very 
high-level, vaguely articulated document.  For example: 
The OMS/MP documents do not typically provide any information 
regarding system life-cycle changes such as pre-planned product 
improvement (P3I) programs, planned upgrades and technology 
refreshments, future interoperability requirements, or plans for future 
integration into tactical and logistical networks. These life-cycle events, 
while known or anticipated, are not effectively communicated to 
potential developers for inclusion in the proposal process and are often 
omitted from the software system design. (Naegle, 2015, pp. 17 & 18) 
With regard to the software component contribution to a weapon system’s 
TOC, the following three research questions frame the focus of this paper: 
First Research Question: With software’s increasing influence in weapon 
system TOC calculations, are there more effective methods to positively influence 
and predict software sustainability costs? 
Second Research Question: Are there aspects in the software environment 
that suggest the need for a supplemental DoD acquisition process driving software 
development toward improved TOC performance? 
Third Research Question: What are the software-related TOC drivers and are 
there effective methods for predicting the software-related TOC costs?
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Congressional Directives 
Weapon systems’ TOC growing price tag has not gone unnoticed by 
Congress, which has responded with considerable TOC-related language in the laws 
that it passes and guidance it provides.  For example, the Weapon Systems 
Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 is all about controlling weapon systems TOC.  In 
addition, TOC performance is what Congress is addressing in its changes to Nunn–
McCurdy.  It is what motivated Congress to require certificates at Milestones A and 
B (10 U.S.C. § 2366a, b).  This appears to be the congressional motive in Public 
Laws 111-84 (National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA] for Fiscal Year 2010, 
2009) and 113-291 (NDAA, 2015), which contain significant DoD TOC-related 
language, discussed in the following section.  Congressional intervention into the 
DoD TOC situation has been driven by a perception that DoD has failed to 
adequately address and control weapon system TOC.  “Having witnessed a lack of 
cost and process discipline spanning many years, particularly in the area of 
sustainment costs, Congress has acted to enforce discipline, instituting procedures 
with force of law to get weapon system costs under control” (Naegle & Boudreau, 
2011, p. 17).  This congressional interest and intervention continues today. 
The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (Naegle & 
Boudreau, 2011) 
The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009 is a 
congressional initiative to increase rigor in development of DoD Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs (MDAPs).  The principal intent seems directed at controlling 
the ownership cost of the DoD’s warfighting systems.  The WSARA advances on a 
number of different fronts, a portion of which are described in the following 
paragraphs (WSARA, 2009).  
Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (“Director CAPE”).  The 
Director CAPE is a new appointive position, devised to give independent advice and 
analysis to the secretary of defense (SECDEF) and deputy secretary of defense 
(DEPSECDEF) on matters that fall within their areas of responsibility. Director CAPE 
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is responsible for functions formerly accomplished by Program Analysis & 
Evaluation, the Defense PA&E (WSARA, 2009, § 101). 
Director CAPE has two deputies (WSARA, 2009, § 101): 
 the Director for Cost Assessment (formed initially from the Cost 
Analysis Improvement Group [CAIG]), and 
 the Director for Program Evaluation (formed from the remnants of 
PA&E, that is, PA&E less the CAIG). 
Responsibilities.  Director CAPE is responsible for cost estimation and cost 
analysis for MDAP acquisition programs, analysis, and advice in the planning and 
programming phases of Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE; 
WSARA, 2009, § 101).  Additionally, Director CAPE provides analysis and advice to 
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and formulates study guidance 
used to conduct an Analysis of Alternatives of new major defense acquisition 
programs (WSARA, 2009, § 201).  These responsibilities place Director CAPE in a 
position to provide advice and direction related to the accuracy of acquisition cost 
estimates and the affordability of acquisition programs.  Quite apparently, Director 
CAPE is charged with advising the JROC to strengthen that body’s role in issues of 
cost and affordability, as noted in the short JCIDS discussion. 
Cost Estimation.  Director CAPE is specifically charged by Congress with 
ensuring the accuracy of cost estimation and cost analysis by prescribing policies 
and procedures specifically related to acquisition programs (WSARA, 2009, § 101).  
In this capacity, Director CAPE is required to provide guidance to and consult with 
OSD leadership and the secretaries of the military departments regarding specific 
cost estimates and cost analyses to be conducted for a major MDAP or major 
automated information system (MAIS) program.  This mandate includes specifics, 
such as the selection of statistical confidence levels of cost estimates in 
consideration of life-cycle costs of MDAP and MAIS programs.  Director CAPE 
specifically reviews independent cost estimates (ICEs) for the Defense Acquisition 
Board (DAB) prior to certifications, low rate initial production (LRIP), or full rate 
production (FRP).  Director CAPE is further charged to review cost analyses and 
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records for MDAP and DAIS and is given authority to participate in discussion of 
discrepancies between ICE and military department cost estimates.  This includes 
disclosure of statistical confidence levels used by Director CAPE and the Services.  
Confidence levels below 80% must be justified and included in the next Selected 
Acquisition Report (SAR), which is sent from PMs, through their component and the 
OSD, to Congress.  Director CAPE is required to report annually on cost-estimating 
accuracy and compliance with policy, along with consistent differences in cost-
estimating methodology by the Services.  This report goes to OSD leadership and 
congressional defense committees and is to be posted on the Internet for public 
review. 
The WSARA specified that Director CAPE must report to the SECDEF on 
O&S costs for MDAPs within one year and to congressional defense committees 
within 30 days thereafter, followed by annual reports (WSARA, 2009, § 101).  This 
represents another action that brings focus to the cost of operating and sustaining 
warfighting systems.  This requirement has caused considerable consternation.  See 
the discussion in the Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report 10-717 section 
later in this paper for additional perspective on the accuracy of O&S cost databases.  
Director of Program Assessment and Root Cause Analysis (Director 
PARCA).  The WSARA (2009, § 103) mandated that the SECDEF designate 
a senior official responsible for conducting program assessment and root 
cause analysis for MDAPs.  Director PARCA is responsible for evaluating the 
utility of performance metrics used to measure cost, schedule, and 
performance of MDAPs and for making recommendations for improvement. 
This individual also advises on MDAP performance issues prior to 
certifications at Milestones A and B, prior to FRP, and in consideration of 
multi-year procurement decisions.  Director PARCA accomplishes root cause 
analysis for MDAPs to determine causes for shortcomings in cost, schedule, 
or performance, including unrealistic performance expectations; unrealistic 
baseline estimates for cost or schedule; immature technologies; unanticipated 
design, engineering, manufacturing, or technology integration issues in 
program performance; changes in procurement quantities; inadequate 
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funding or funding instability; or poor PM performance (Government and/or 
contractor).  Director PARCA must report annually (initially March 2010) on 
root cause analyses for MDAPs and submit to congressional defense 
committees a report of activities undertaken during the preceding year. 
Director of Defense Research & Engineering (DDRE; WSARA, 2009, § 
104).  Together with the Director of Developmental Test and Evaluation 
(Director DT&E), DDRE reviews and assesses the technological maturity and 
integration risks of MDAPs.  The WSARA requires annual reports (initially 
March 2010) to the SECDEF and the congressional defense committees.  
This strongly encourages MDAs, PEOs, and PMs to not permit programs to 
move forward until they are technologically ready. 
Director of Systems Engineering (WSARA, 2009, § 102). This director 
is required to develop policy and guidance for systems engineering master 
plans for MDAPs in support of life-cycle management, sustainability, and 
reliability growth in contractor proposals.  This directly relates to life-cycle cost 
(LCC) because of the focus placed on sustainability cost, typically the largest 
component of LCC.  This is further discussed in the Other Documents section 
later in this paper, specifically RADM (R) Don Eaton’s published perspective 
that poor reliability estimates distort true sustainment costs and that poor 
reliability is a large cost driver.  If the contention is accurate that poor 
reliability estimates are a major cost driver, this should soon begin to appear 
in the root cause analyses that are mandated for programs that experience 
significant cost overruns. 
Director DT&E and Director of Systems Engineering are required by 
WSARA to issue guidance on and detailed measureable performance criteria 
related to Systems Engineering Master Plans (SEMPs) and Developmental 
Test and Evaluation (DT&E) plans for MDAPS.  Among these measureable 
performance criteria would likely be reliability, availability, maintainability, and 
related O&S costs; WSARA mandates establishment of a database to record 
and track weapon system performance data (WSARA, 2009, § 102). 
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JROC.  The WSARA specifically charges the SECDEF to ensure that 
the JROC is engaged in consideration of trade-offs among cost, schedule, 
and performance objectives (§ 201).  It was noted in our 2003 R-TOC report 
that the JROC was not focused on TOC and that the leadership was not 
“speaking with one voice” concerning the importance of TOC (Boudreau & 
Naegle, 2003, p. 49).  This now appears to have been addressed as a matter 
of law. 
Milestone Decision Authority (MDA).  The WSARA mandates that MDA 
ensure appropriate trade-offs among cost, schedule, and performance 
objectives to increase confidence that the program is affordable (WSARA, 
2009, § 201).  The words are straightforward and unambiguous, but the 
interpretation of the “cost” element must be correctly applied to system life-
cycle cost, not procurement cost. 
Competition Throughout the Life Cycle (WSARA, 2009, § 202).  The 
WSARA identifies 10 different approaches that may be incorporated into a 
MDAP acquisition strategy to ensure competition be used if cost effective.  
The list includes competitive prototyping; dual-sourcing; unbundling of 
contracts; use of modular, open architecture to enable competition for 
upgrades; use of build-to-print approaches; and acquisition of complete 
TDPs—along with several other approaches.  These suggested measures 
involve competition among prime contractors and also among subcontractors 
at such tiers as appropriate.  The WSARA views competition as extending 
into operations and sustainment of MDAPs. 
Competitive Prototyping (WSARA, 2009, § 203).  The WSARA 
mandates that MDAPs include competitive prototyping in their acquisition 
strategies prior to Milestone B (MS B) approval—that is, during the 
Technology Development Phase—unless waived by the Milestone Decision 
Authority.  Waivers are specifically limited to cost effectiveness or failure to 
meet critical national security objectives.  In the event of a waiver of 
competitive prototyping because it is not cost effective, non-competitive 
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prototyping of the system is still required prior to MS B, if benefits exceed cost 
and are consistent with national security objectives (WSARA, 2009, § 203).  
The importance of competitive prototyping is that contractors will feel 
competitive pressure earlier in the process.  While generally considered good 
for the taxpayer, it is arguable that competitive prototyping has not resulted in 
cost reduction for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), which engaged in competitive 
prototypes but afterward experienced significant cost growth. While there may 
be multiple reasons for the cost growth experienced, the JSF program may 
reflect contractor “buy-in,” long a problem in DoD acquisition programs. 
Milestone Decision Authority Certifications and Follow-On Notifications 
(WSARA, 2009, § 204).  Title 10 U.S.C. 2366a has been tightened, requiring 
in the MDA’s Milestone A (MS A) certifications that Congress be notified if a 
program experiences or anticipates a cost slip of 25% or anticipates a 
schedule slip of 25% or more in meeting Initial Operational Capability (IOC). 
The MDA shall notify Congress within 30 days of identifying root causes and 
appropriate performance measures to guide the rest of the program 
development, and specifically addressing (a) the essentiality of the program 
to national security, (b) the lack of less costly alternatives, (c) new estimates 
of reasonable cost and schedule for the program, and (d) the adequacy of the 
program’s management structure to control program cost and schedule.  
Milestone B Certification Modification (WSARA, 2009, § 205). For 
programs that have gone through MS B decision, 10 U.S.C. 2366b 
certification has been amended by WSARA to require that Congress be 
notified of waivers by the MDA, in writing within 30 days, explaining the basis 
for a waiver.  The MDA must review a troubled program at least annually to 
determine the extent to which the program is satisfying the certification terms, 
until such time as the MDA determines that the program has satisfied all the 
elements of the certification. Budget documents submitted to Congress or the 
President must be clearly marked as not fully satisfying the certification until 
the program has made the necessary corrections.  
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Nunn-McCurdy Cost Breach Modifications (WSARA, 2009, § 206). 
Title 10 U.S.C. 2433 (generally known as the Nunn-McCurdy Cost Breaches) 
has been amended by WSARA to require that the MDA consult with the 
JROC regarding program requirements.  Then the MDA must determine the 
root cause or causes of the cost growth and, in consultation with Director 
CAPE, assess the following: the cost of completing the program with and 
without reasonable modification, the rough order of magnitude of proceeding 
with an alternative system or capability, and the need to shift funds from other 
programs due to the cost growth.  There is a presumption of program 
termination unless the MDA notifies Congress of a waiver within 60 days.  If 
the program is not terminated, the Secretary shall restructure the program, 
rescind the most recent milestone approval, require a new milestone 
approval, and require onerous additional program reviews.   
The WSARA of 2009 Summary.  There is no doubt that the demands made in 
WSARA increased the rigor and discipline required in acquisition and will be 
reflected in more careful cost estimation, increased caution in reviewing 
technological maturity before advancing programs to the next acquisition step or 
phase, better systems engineering and test planning, and renewed reliance on 
competition.  All of these facets have the potential to better control life-cycle cost.  
Conversely, all the same facets introduce the potential for added bureaucracy and 
unnecessary delay.  The WSARA initiatives address past shortcomings in MDAP 
acquisitions that have contributed to the increase of LCC.  Whether these initiatives 
will reduce cost through better management or increase cost through additional 
bureaucracy remains to be seen. 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Section 
805 (Naegle & Boudreau, 2011) 
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 has special 
relevance to life-cycle cost, as will be explained. In this law, Congress mandated the 
product support manager (PSM) participation in MDAPs.  The law emphasized that 
the PSM works for the PM, but is also specifically tasked to focus on product 
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sustainment (O&S) cost.  This law increased the stature of the program’s chief 
logistician, the individual who is responsible for developing a product support 
strategy for the warfighting system.  Although a logistician, the PSM is responsible 
for conducting cost analyses to validate the product support (sustainment) strategy, 
including cost-benefit analyses that are described in OMB Circular A-94.  The PSM 
is tasked to balance PBL support for optimization.  He or she must review and 
revalidate product support strategies prior to a change in strategy or every five years 
(NDAA, 2010, § 805).  The congressional conferees recognized that product support 
encompasses a wide range of logistics functions, including readiness, reliability, 
availability, and logistics burden (footprint) reduction—all of which explicitly or 
implicitly impact ownership cost (Kobren, 2010, p. 192).  The NDAA for FY 2010 
very apparently established a position within the MDAP PM office that is responsible 
for sustainment cost, to include reliability, which directly influences sustainment cost. 
Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2009, Section 814, Configuration Steering Boards for Cost Control 
Under Major Defense Acquisition Programs (Naegle & Boudreau, 
2011) 
DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02 of December 2008 very succinctly 
promulgates the requirements of section 814 of the Duncan Hunter NDAA for FY 
2009, specific to the formation of configuration steering boards (CSBs), as follows: 
The Acquisition Executive of each DoD Component shall establish 
and chair a CSB with broad executive membership including senior 
representatives from the Office of the USD (AT&L) and the Joint Staff. 
Additional executive members shall include representatives from the 
office of the chief of staff of the Armed Force concerned, other Armed 
Forces representatives where appropriate, the military deputy to the 
CAE and the Program Executive Officer (PEO) (section 814 of P.L. 
110-417, Reference (w)).   
(1)  The CSB shall meet at least annually to review all requirements 
changes and any significant technical configuration changes for 
ACAT I and IA programs in development that have the potential 
to result in cost and schedule impacts to the program. Such 
changes will generally be rejected, deferring them to future 
blocks or increments. Changes shall not be approved unless 
funds are identified and schedule impacts mitigated. 
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(2)  The PM, in consultation with the PEO, shall, on a roughly 
annual basis, identify and propose a set of descoping [sic] 
options, with supporting rationale addressing operational 
implications, to the CSB that reduce program cost or moderate 
requirements. The CSB shall recommend to the MDA (if an 
ACAT ID or IAM program) which of these options should be 
implemented. Final decisions on descoping [sic] option 
implementation shall be coordinated with the Joint Staff and 
military department requirements officials. (USD[AT&L], 2008c, 
Enclosure 2, p. 30, para 9.d.)  
This law introduces a strong bias toward limiting design changes to systems.  
Note the Service user representative is not named as a member of the CSB.  The 
presumption may be that the user would tend to encourage requirements growth and 
costly changes. The CSB, for its part, will listen to the proposed change and make 
the board recommendations to the program MDA.  In Part 2, the PM is directed to 
propose de-scoping options to reduce cost and requirements.  The MDA is required 
to coordinate changes with the Joint Staff and component requirements officials (i.e., 
user representatives).  The wording clearly indicates a bias against changes that will 
increase cost, or at the least deferring such changes to a future block or increment. 
Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 
The specific discussion referenced below is from  Section 801, Modular Open 
Systems Approaches in Acquisition Programs; Section 831, Chief Information Officer 
Authority Enhancements; Section 832, Enhanced Transparency and Improved Risk 
Management in Information Technology Investments; Section 833, The Tenets of 
Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act—FITARA 
The 2015 NDAA included some specific language impacting software 
acquisition and software-related TOC, including the tenets of the Federal Information 
Technology Acquisition Reform Act Bill.  Section 801 put into law the requirement  
for DoD software-intensive systems to implement an “open systems” structure to the 
maximum extent possible.  Specifically, 
The Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics shall 
review current acquisition guidance, and modify such guidance as 
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necessary to (A) ensure that acquisition programs include open 
systems approaches in the product design and acquisition of 
information technology systems to the maximum extent practicable; 
and (B) for any information technology system not using an open 
systems approach, ensure that written justification is provided in the 
contract file for the system detailing why an open systems approach 
was not used. (NDAA, 2015, p. 136) 
Sections 831 through 834 codified the tenets of the FITARA bill, as it failed to 
be passed into law separately.  The FITARA was designed to apply only to non-
tactical information technology (IT) systems, but DoD systems are rarely separated 
so cleanly.  For example, a system for DoD contracting might appear to be non-
tactical until contingency contracting teams are deployed in support of the theater 
commander in a tactical situation.  Also, non-tactical IT systems are integrated onto 
tactical weapon systems such as the FAA air traffic control system, which is 
necessarily integrated into tactical aircraft. 
The FITARA tenets include enhanced authority for chief information officers 
(CIOs), directing Governmental CIOs to have more authority in the acquisition of IT 
systems (Section 831).  The DoD was provided specific exemption to this 
requirement, but with the examples provided above, there would be opportunities for 
overlap in acquisition authority. 
Section 832 directs enhanced transparency and improved risk management 
for “covered” IT systems, again exempting DoD “national security” systems (NDAA, 
2015, p. 150).  While clearly exempting some DoD systems, the DoD remains 
subject to the improved risk management for many of their systems. 
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TOC Reports 
GAO/T-NSIAD-98-123 and other GAO reports on Knowledge Point 
Management (Naegle & Boudreau, 2011) 
Knowledge point management can be used to avoid program delays and the 
additional cost that accompanies schedule delays. For more than 12 years, the GAO 
has advocated the use of knowledge point management to guide development of 
warfighting systems and to control the advancement of programs until said systems 
have demonstrated their readiness to proceed to the next step in the development 
process (Defense Acquisition: Improved Program Outcomes, 1998).  The three 
knowledge points recommended by the GAO are described in the following 
paragraphs. 
Knowledge Point 1 occurs near Milestone B. The user’s requirements must 
be synchronized with technology that is mature enough to support the endeavor, 
allow sufficient time scheduled to succeed, and provide sufficient funding to 
complete the development (GAO, 2003, p. 16).  This knowledge point became 
relatively better understood when the Technology Readiness Level Deskbook was 
published in 2005 (Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Science and Technology 
[DUSD(S&T)], 2005).  Matching requirements against resources is a matter of 
discipline, and having the requisite knowledge before proceeding on is necessary 
because if any one of the several elements is absent (such as the application of 
required technologies while they are still immature), the program will likely be 
delayed and the impact on cost may be severe.  Continuing GAO reviews have 
shown that Knowledge Point 1 demands enormous discipline that has, unfortunately, 
often been beyond the discipline demonstrated by DoD leadership over many years.  
In addition, software development (not reuse, commercial off-the-shelf [COTS], or 
government off-the-shelf [GOTS]) tends to behave as a new, immature technology, 
with each effort started from scratch.  To combat this inherent problem, potential 
MDAP and MAIS software developers must undergo a maturity evaluation like the 
Software Engineering Institute’s (SEI) Capability Maturity Model–Integrated (CMMI) 
and achieve a certain level of maturity through independent evaluation.  For the 
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Capability Maturity Models, the potential software developer must achieve Level 3 or 
higher to be eligible to compete for the development (USD[AT&L], 2003]).  It is also 
advisable for the PM office to be similarly evaluated using something like the SEI’s 
CMMI-ACQ for acquisition activities, to help minimize the maturity risk with 
developing software.  More often than not, programs are authorized to move into the 
Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase before the technology is 
sufficiently mature to support a detailed design. 
Knowledge Point 2 occurs when the design demonstrates that it is able to 
meet performance requirements.  The design must be stable (i.e., 90% of the 
engineering drawings must be complete) and testing must show that the system 
performs at an acceptable level (GAO, 2003, p. 16).  Although it would seem that 
completion of 90% of the engineering drawings is not a severe metric, this is quite 
demanding; failure to abide by this knowledge point is likely to slow down prototype 
build and result in prototype test failures caused by designs that were not quite 
ready for prime time. 
Knowledge Point 3 occurs when the system can be manufactured within cost, 
schedule, and quality targets and it operates reliably (GAO, 2003, p. 16).  In 
statistical process control terms, critical manufacturing processes are in control and 
consistently producing within quality standards and design tolerances.  Reliability is 
demonstrated in iterative testing (i.e., comparison testing of manufactured product).  
This point should be demonstrated during LRIP, prior to the FRP decision.  Failure to 
achieve this knowledge point will result in manufacturing delays, high costs of 
reworking or repairing manufacturing defects, and customers unhappy with the 
weapon system quality. 
Knowledge Point Management is not new.  The GAO did not invent the 
approach in 1998.  It borrowed the idea from industry, recognizing that the technique 
should, and could, be applied to DoD acquisition.  Recent changes to the Defense 
Acquisition System have largely embraced Knowledge Point Management.  Getting 
acquisition programs synchronized with this approach has not happened overnight 
and is unlikely to happen for all programs if not strictly enforced by DoD leadership. 
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Evolutionary Acquisition.  The use of evolutionary acquisition fits conveniently 
with Knowledge Point 1, discussed previously.  Sometimes technology does not 
become mature as soon as hoped.  Depending on the circumstances, technological 
immaturity might delay an MS B decision and the associated program new-start.  In 
some cases, a technology that matures slower than needed may be substituted by 
an alternative technology that is mature and immediately available.  Plainly, this 
hinges on whether or not the developing system can result in an increment of useful 
warfighting capability—as determined by the sponsor/user.  Even when this 
happens, the program faces a difficult path that requires “extra” milestones that are 
exhausting to a program office staff.  Such is the nature of evolutionary acquisition—
avoiding one dilemma and replacing it with another.  The evolutionary approach 
places heavy demands on a program office, which must prepare for a series of 
otherwise unnecessary milestones.  Is it worth it? 
The temptation might be to move the program ahead, betting that the required 
technology solution will miraculously arrive or mature just in time.  While miracles 
sometimes happen, they should not be the anticipated substitute for a sound, well-
planned, and executable strategy. 
The logistics impact cannot be ignored, either.  The result will either be 
multiple configurations or an expensive modification/upgrade program.  Such 
impacts might play out for many years or even for the lifetime of the warfighting 
system.  This may be associated training issues, repair parts configuration issues, 
software patches, and operational impacts.  The cost of evolutionary acquisition 
could conceivably approach or even exceed the original cost of the program delay. 
The right answer in acquisition depends on the circumstances.  The effect on 
ownership cost should always be one of the metrics used to select the best course 
of action. 
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GAO Report 10-717 (Naegle & Boudreau, 2011) 
In July 2010, the GAO published Defense Management: DOD Needs Better 
Information and Guidance to More Effectively Manage and Reduce Operating and 
Support Costs of Major Weapon Systems (GAO, 2010b).  This report painted a 
dreary picture of relevant databases.  The GAO found that important O&S cost-
estimate documents had not been retained and that there were apparent gaps in the 
DoD’s ability to capture actual O&S costs through the Services’ Visibility and 
Maintenance of Operations and Support Costs databases (VAMOSC; GAO, 2010b, 
p. 16).  Data in VAMOSC and other Service information systems or sources was 
inaccurate and incomplete (GAO, 2010b, pp. 16–20).  The report stated that the 
important MDAP system life-cycle cost estimates were not being routinely retained 
or updated, nor was there a policy requiring that this be done.  The GAO pointed out 
that there were no agreed-to O&S cost elements or metrics for tracking and 
assessing actual O&S cost performance for the various categories of weapon 
systems, but it noted that the Services should be required to collect and assess such 
data and maintain it in their VAMOSC databases.  The GAO singled out the Army in 
particular as needing to develop and implement a strategy for improving its 
VAMOSC system.  On August 19, 2010, Director CAPE was quoted by Inside the 
Pentagon as asking for relief from the requirement to establish O&S baselines for 
warfighting systems, ostensibly reporting that this initiative would be “infeasible and 
not advisable” (Mishory, 2010) because the VAMOSC database was severely 
flawed.  Director CAPE appears to be in agreement with the GAO that sustainment 
data is flawed or missing and not suitable for rigorous analysis and assessment.  A 
review of the GAO report suggests an array of difficulties in comparing actual data to 
baselines.  Aircraft systems reviewed by the GAO appeared to cost less than 
expected because the quantities operating in the fleet were generally different 
(usually fewer) than expected (GAO, 2010b, p. 21).  However, costs also were 
affected by unexpected changes in operational tempo (specifically, flying hours; 
GAO, 2010b, p. 22).  Although both those factors might upset budget predictions, 
they need not upset performance predictions; rather, if shown as “cost per usage,” 
reasonable comparisons might show the weapon system’s performance against 
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baseline performance.  Cost per mile or cost per flying hour or round fired could be 
compared to early cost estimates, as-tested costs, and changes in cost per year.  
Such comparisons would never be perfect, but they would suggest whether a 
weapon system was performing within the expected range.   
VAMOSC data, by its very nature, is collected from many and varied 
locations—sometimes in garrison or home port, sometimes in operational and 
combat areas.  There should never be an expectation of perfect or highly refined 
data, but, outside of combat areas, data ought to be collected that is “good enough” 
to support assessments as to whether equipment is operating in the expected 
performance range, if metrics are established for expected cost drivers.  As 
suggested in our 2003 report, sample data collection (SDC), although expensive, 
provides a method for improving the accuracy of logistics and O&S cost data 
(Boudreau & Naegle, 2003). 
Looking specifically at aviation systems across the Services, the GAO 
reported that most systems had no record of O&S cost estimates related to key 
milestone decisions.  Two aircraft systems, the Air Force F-22A fighter and the Navy 
F/A 18F/G, did have some recorded O&S cost estimates (GAO, 2010b, pp. 24–26). 
The two cited examples suggest the seriousness of O&S cost-estimating inaccuracy 
and/or cost growth.  F-22A actual cost per flight hour in 2007 was $55,783—67% 
higher than the $33,762 that had been projected in the 2007 President’s Budget.  
Similarly, on a flight hour basis, the Navy F/A 18E/F cost $15,346 per flight hour of 
operation—40% higher than the $10,979 predicted in 1999. 
GAO-08-1159T, Defense Acquisitions: Fundamental Changes Are 
Needed to Improve Weapon Procurement Outcomes (Naegle & 
Boudreau, 2011) 
In his testimony, the GAO Director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management, 
Michael Sullivan, succinctly identified systemic problems that led to poor acquisition 
outcomes (GAO, 2008).  His findings identified disconnects in the three systems that 
are essential to the acquisition of military weapons—the planning, programming, 
budgeting, and execution process (PPBE), the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
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Development System (JCIDS), and the Defense Acquisition System.  He further 
characterized a breakdown of systems engineering at critical junctures, referred to 
as knowledge points.  He also described a culture in the Services and the DoD that 
incentivizes overpromising system performance and underestimating cost and 
schedule, a pervasive problem across the DoD for many years. 
DoD Weapon System Acquisition Reform Product Support 
Assessment (Naegle & Boudreau, 2011) 
In the Product Support Assessment Team’s (PSAT’s) November 2009 report, 
DoD Weapon System Acquisition Reform Product Support Assessment, the team 
listed eight areas to improve product support.  At least five of the areas impact 
system life-cycle cost (e.g., Product Support Business Model, Metrics, Operating 
and Support Costs, Analytical Tools, and Human Capital; PSAT, 2009, pp. 12–13). 
Institute for Defense Analyses Study: The Major Causes of Cost 
Growth in Defense Acquisition (Naegle & Boudreau, 2011) 
The 2009 Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) study, led by Gene Porter, 
examined 11 MDAP systems that had exhibited significant cost growth between 
1995 and 2006.  The primary causes of cost growth stemmed from two defects: 
“weaknesses in management visibility, direction, and oversight” and “weaknesses in 
initial program definition and costing,” neither of which was a new phenomenon 
(Porter et al., 2009, pp. ES-6—ES-14).  Much of the blame for the first weakness 
was “a general lack of discipline” (Porter et al., 2009, p. ES-6). 
Porter et al. (2009) make a series of recommendations that are intended to 
address the causes of cost growth reflected in their study; their recommendations 
are supportive of the goals of WSARA of 2009 (pp. ES-15–ES-18). 
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Other Documents (Naegle & Boudreau, 2011) 
In his memorandum, State of Reliability, Dr. J. Michael Gilmore, the Director 
of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E, 2010), made the link that poor reliability 
is a major contributor to LCC.  The implication is that the long-held 28-72 LCC 
statistics could be altered by front-end attention to reliability growth.  That is, 
investing more RDTE funding in reliability improvement at the front end could result 
in higher reliability components that would cost less to operate, malfunctioning less 
often.  The remarkable thing here is that program leadership has tried to improve 
reliability in many, if not all, programs.  Gilmore made reference to a recently 
published reliability standard, ANSI/GEIA-STD-0009, which should be employed.  
He quoted a May 2008 Defense Science Board (DSB) report, which stated that “high 
suitability (reliability) failure rates were caused by the lack of a disciplined systems 
engineering process, including a robust reliability growth program” (DSB, 2008, in 
the task force chairman’s cover letter).  The DSB further emphasized that the “single 
most important step … is to … execute a viable systems engineering strategy from 
the beginning, including a robust reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM) 
program” (DOT&E, 2010, pp. 1–2) 
Gilmore made his case further by stating,  
I understand that directing use of ANSI/GEIA STD-0009 is a change 
from business as usual. That change is urgently needed. Requiring the 
use of 0009 is appropriate for the following reasons:  
 0009 is credible. To obtain an ANSI certification, 0009 was peer 
reviewed by 350 subject matter experts (SMEs) from all walks of 
the reliability community, including government, Services, 
academia, and industry.  
 0009 is new, different, necessary. ANSI/GEIA STD-0009 is not 
similar to MIL-STD-785B. The two standards are quite different, 
and MIL-STD-785B will not suffice. MIL-STD-785B required a 
“level-of-effort” and discrete tasks, but not system engineering 
processes. MIL-STD-785B had no systematic processes to 
identify and mitigate failure modes throughout the product life 
cycle. 0009 corrects the failings of 785B. 
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 0009 has become a model for others. Since publication of 
ANSI/GEIA STD-0009, major standards such as SAE JA 1000 
and IEEE 1332 are now being rewritten to embrace the science-
based, closed-looped approach of ANSI/GEIA STD-0009.  
 0009 has been formally adopted by DoD for use (August 20, 
2009). ANSI/GEIA STD-0009 will ensure a systems level 
approach to identify and mitigate failure modes until 
requirements are met. (DOT&E, 2010, p. 3)  
In his own words, Gilmore has publically entered into the reliability dialog 
because  
discussions that have occurred among our staffs participating in the re-
convened Reliability Working Group indicate that there is some 
question as to whether reliability is an important issue, and there also 
appear to be questions about the merits of the reliability standard 
ANSI/GEIA-STD-0009. (DOT&E, 2010, p. 1) 
Gilmore emphatically stated in the very next paragraph of his memo that there 
is no question about it.  That is, defense acquisition systems completing research 
and development (R&D) are often not reliable, and he linked poor reliability to 
sustainment costs that are higher than necessary (DOT&E, 2010, p. 1).  This is 
reflective of findings in RADM (R) Don Eaton’s 2004 paper, discussed in this section. 
RADM Don Eaton, retired Arthur Chair in Logistic Management at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, said in a July 24, 2010, e-mail, “If we thoughtfully analyzed the 
FOMs [figures of merit] of COST, SCHEDULE AND PERFORMANCE we would 
always conclude poor reliability is THE dominant cost driver as well as a key player 
in mission failure.”  In his August 2004 paper, Improving the Management of 
Reliability, he provided a stunning example from naval aviation, the trailing edge flap 
actuator for the F/A 18 A-D.  He pointed out that the component reliability was set at 
4,000 hours mean time between failure (MTBF). In operation, the demonstrated 
performance in MTBF was 138 hours, 3.45% of what it was supposed to be (Eaton, 
2004, pp. 5–6).  RADM Eaton did not attempt to calculate the impact to sustainment 
cost because that was not the purpose of his paper.  Nevertheless, without 
calculating the impact in dollars, one can see that such poor performance reflects in 
significantly increased costs in maintenance man-hours for repair, repair parts 
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consumed, transportation of repair parts and/or replacement components, and 
required stockage levels that had to be maintained, not to mention the impact on the 
aircraft’s mission availability rate.  Such examples are not unique to aircraft, or to the 
Navy.  Many, if not all, programs have reliability “bad actors” that need to be 
redesigned and replaced because of what they are costing in maintenance time, 
repair parts expense, and transportation.  This situation could be improved by 
rigorous reliability improvement programs during system development, as described 
in the statements by Gilmore referred to previously.  This would require disciplined 
leadership, PMOs determined to get the design right, and user insistence that 
reliability goals are set—and achieved—for warfighting systems. 
Reliability improvement is bolstered by the involvement of product support 
managers as encouraged in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010, Section 805.  The 
reliability improvement process can be enhanced by the use of collaborative tools to 
involve life-cycle logistics professionals and make available repair parts databases 
to sharpen design decisions.  This effort can be further helped by Pareto analysis—
that is, focus on the cost drivers, primarily the expensive items that break more often 
than predicted.  This approach can be used early in the design process, too, by 
searching systems command and DLA databases to examine performance of similar 
or predecessor systems. 
It is easy for field users, maintainers, and PMs to visualize cost databases that can 
be used to identify cost drivers in fielded, legacy systems.  This is important work 
and a principal focus of VAMOSC databases, maintained by each of the Services.  
However, it must also be recognized that O&S databases are needed to support 
early O&S calculations of emerging systems, still in pre-acquisition.  In her 2010 
report, Marti A. Roper discussed the need for databases that support acquisition 
cost estimates—down to subsystem or component levels, showing cost ranges. 
Such a knowledge base is critical for the development of follow-on systems so that 
known cost drivers can be addressed for potentially significant life-cycle cost savings 
with deployment of the replacement system.  Roper (2010) referred to this as 
capabilities-based parametric data analysis (pp. 71–73)   
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DoD Policy  
In response to the laws and guidance published by Congress, the OSD 
develops supporting policies and guidance to implement the intention of Congress.  
For the acquisition community, the USD(AT&L) provides the leadership and direction 
for the implementation. 
The OSD implemented the 2009 version of WSARA on December 4, 2010, 
through the USD(AT&L) publication of Directive Type Memorandum (DTM) 09-027 
(USD[AT&L], 2009b).  About 10 months later, on October 21, 2010, the USD(AT&L) 
amended the original document, establishing a date by which the DoDI 5000.02 had 
to be revised (USD[AT&L], 2010c). 
In addition to re-publishing the DoD Directives to reflect the new guidance, 
two consecutive USD(AT&L) executives published specific guidance in the Better 
Buying Power (BBP) series of implantation memoranda, detailed in the following 
section. 
Better Buying Power (1.0) (Naegle & Boudreau, 2011) 
Corollary to WSARA implementation, the USD(AT&L) published the 
Implementation Directive for Better Buying Power—Obtaining Greater Efficiency and 
Productivity in Defense Spending (USD[AT&L], 2010d).  The intent of this 
implementation directive was to reach beyond WSARA mandates to obtain greater 
affordability-based decision-making in warfighting system programs.  Pertinent 
specifics are as follows.  
• Mandate affordability as a requirement.  PMs are now required to treat 
affordability like a Key Performance Parameter (KPP) at Milestone A.  The 
affordability target is to be stated in two metrics: average unit acquisition 
cost and average annual operating and support cost per unit.  These 
metrics will be the basis for pre-MS B decision-making and systems 
engineering trade-off analysis to establish cost and schedule trade space.  
Such a mandate requires a database similar to the one Roper (2010) 
described (pp. 71–73).  This will provide a basis for comparison against 
the applicable portfolio or mission area, and will reflect acquisition and 
O&S budget suitability to absorb the proposed program new start.  
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Analysis must address specific adjustments to fit new programs affordably 
into their portfolio or mission area (USD[AT&L], 2010d, p. 1). 
• The MS B acquisition decision memorandum will include an affordability 
requirement for acquisition cost and O&S cost that will be the functional 
equivalent to a KPP and will be established as Acquisition Program 
Baseline (APB) metrics (USD[AT&L], 2010d, p. 2). 
• Productivity growth through will cost/should cost.  Should-cost targets will 
be set for all ACAT I, II, and III programs under consideration for major 
milestone decisions.  Should-cost targets will be based on thoroughly 
scrubbed bottom-up assessments, assuming reasonable efficiency and 
productivity enhancement effort.  Should-cost will be used as the basis of 
contract negotiation and incentives to track contractor and PEO/PM 
performance annually (USD[AT&L], 2010d, p. 2).  Independent cost 
estimates will establish “forecasts of what a program will cost based on 
reasonable extrapolations from historical experience—to support 
budgeting and programming” (USD[AT&L], 2010a, p. 3).  The motivation 
for industry is higher profit for better performance.  
• Eliminate redundancy within warfighter portfolios.  The DoD and the 
components have begun portfolio reviews to identify and eliminate system 
redundancy in warfighting systems.  This function will be accomplished 
annually by the military departments and agencies (USD[AT&L], 2010d, p. 
2). 
• Make production rates economical and stable.  This element is intended to 
synchronize production to portfolio affordability targets set at MS A, as 
adjusted at MS B, and economic order quantity (EOQ).  Production rates 
will be part of the affordability analysis at MS A and MS B.  MS C now 
requires a range of production rates, and deviation from that range without 
prior approval will lead to revocation of the milestone (USD[AT&L], 2010a, 
p. 4). 
• Set shorter program timelines.  Schedule slips are very expensive and 
delay the arrival of needed equipment into the hands of warfighters.  
Unfortunately, long developmental programs have been the norm for 
many years (USD[AT&L], 2010a, pp. 4–5).  For future programs, the 
program schedule will be set at MS B, consistent with the cost trade-off 
analysis.  This is logical because cost and schedule must be synchronized 
to meet affordability targets.  Deviation from schedule without prior 
approval will lead to revocation of the milestone (USD[AT&L], 2010d, p. 2).  
• Present a competitive acquisition strategy at each milestone.  ACAT I, II, 
III, and IV are all required to include a competitive strategy prior to each 
milestone and to include reduction of single-bid competitions.  The 
strategy will include discussion of market research, restricted 
specifications, and adequate time for proposal preparation.  A 2% 
improvement goal of one-bid statistics has been established for 2011 
(USD[AT&L], 2010d, p. 4). 
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• Remove obstacles to competition.  Contract officers are required to 
conduct negotiations with all single-bid offerors, unless waived by the 
Head of Contracting agency (HCA), and the basis of negotiation shall be 
cost or price analysis, using non-certified data.  Component or agency 
competition advocates are required to achieve an improvement rate of 
10% per year in effective competition (USD[AT&L], 2010d, p. 4). 
• Require open systems architecture and acquisition of tech data rights.  
Use of open system architecture and tech data rights will both be pursued 
to ensure the programs’ lifetime consideration of competition.  The results 
of these initiatives will be reported in the Acquisition Strategy Reports 
(USD[AT&L], 2010d, pp. 4–5). 
Better Buying Power 2.0 
Following the implementation memorandum detailed in the previous section, 
the USD(AT&L) published a second memorandum titled Implementation Directive for 
Better Buying Power 2.0—Achieving Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense 
Spending (USD[AT&L], 2013).  This memorandum emphasized the continuation of 
Better Buying Power 1.0 in seven areas that were detailed above, with guidance for 
achieving the desired results shown here as sub-bullets: 
• Achieve Affordable Programs 
o Mandate affordability as a requirement 
o Institute a system of investment planning to derive affordability 
o Enforce affordability caps 
• Control Costs Throughout Product Lifecycle 
o Implement “should cost” based management 
o Eliminate redundancy within Warfighter portfolios 
o Institute a system to measure the cost performance of programs 
and institutions and to assess the effectiveness of acquisition 
policies 
o Build stronger partnerships with the requirements community to 
control costs 
o Increase the incorporation of defense exportability features in initial 
designs 
• Incentivize Productivity and Innovation in Industry and Government 
o Align profitability more tightly with Department goals 
o Employ appropriate contract types 
o Increase use of Fixed Price Incentive contracts in Low Rate Initial 
Production 
o Better define value in “best value” competitions 
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o When Lowest Price Technically Acceptable is used, define 
Technically Acceptable to ensure needed quality 
o Institute a superior supplier incentive program 
o Increase effective use of Performance-Based Logistics 
o Reduce backlog of DCAA Audits without compromising 
effectiveness 
o Expand programs to leverage industry’s IR&D 
• Eliminate Unproductive Processes and Bureaucracy 
o Reduce frequency of higher headquarters level reviews 
o Re-emphasize Acquisition Executive, PEO and PM responsibility, 
authority, and accountability 
o Reduce cycle times while ensuring sound investment decisions 
• Promote Effective Competition 
o Emphasize competition strategies and create and maintain 
competitive environments 
o Enforce open system architectures and effectively manage 
technical data rights 
o Increase small business roles and opportunities 
o Use the Technology Development phase for true risk reduction 
• Improve Tradecraft in Acquisition of Services 
o Assign senior managers for acquisition of services 
o Measure productivity using the uniform services market 
segmentation 
o Improve requirements definition/prevent requirements creep 
o Increase small business participation, including through more 
effective use of market research 
o Strengthen contract management outside the normal acquisition 
chain—installations, etc. 
o Expand use of requirements review boards and tripwires 
• Improve the Professionalism of the Total Acquisition Workforce 
o Establish higher standards for key leadership positions 
o Establish increased professional qualification requirements for all 
acquisition specialties 
o Increase the recognition and support of excellence in acquisition 
management 
o Continue to increase the cost consciousness of the acquisition 
workforce—change the culture (USD[AT&L], 2013, p. 3)   
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Better Buying Power 3.0 
The third in the Better Buying Power series is BBP 3.0, with implementing 
memorandum titled Implementation Directive for Better Buying Power 3.0—
Achieving Dominant Capabilities through Technical Excellence and Innovation, 
dated April 9, 2015.  This version continued the tenets of the other BBP initiatives, 
with the Honorable Frank Kendall stating, 
Core initiatives focus on: ensuring that programs we pursue are 
affordable, mandating that our managers identify and pursue “should 
cost” savings opportunities, providing effective incentives to industry, 
emphasizing competition, reducing bureaucracy, improving our 
acquisition of contracted services, and building our professionalism.  
We will continue all of these efforts. (USD[AT&L], 2015, p. 1)  
The major areas emphasized are bulleted as follows, with the implementation 
guidance specified as sub-bullets: 
• Achieve Affordable Programs 
o Continue to set and enforce affordability caps 
• Achieve Dominant Capabilities While Controlling Lifecycle Costs 
o Strengthen and expand “should cost” based cost management 
o Anticipate and plan for responsive and emerging threats by building 
stronger partnerships of acquisition, requirements and intelligence 
communities 
o Institutionalize stronger DoD level Long Range R&D Program Plans 
o Strengthen cybersecurity throughout the product lifecycle 
• Incentivize Productivity in Industry and Government 
o Align profitability more tightly with Department goals 
o Employ appropriate contract types, but increase the use of 
incentive type contracts 
o Expand the superior supplier incentive program 
o Ensure effective use of Performance-Based Logistics 
o Remove barriers to commercial technology utilization 
o Improve the return on investment in DoD laboratories 
o Increase the productivity of corporate IRAD 
• Incentivize Innovation in Industry and Government 
o Increase the use of prototyping and experimentation 
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o Emphasize technology insertion and refresh in program planning 
o Use Modular Open Systems Architecture to stimulate innovation 
o Increase the return on and access to small business research and 
development 
o Provide draft technical requirements to industry early and involve 
industry in funded concept definition 
o Provide clear and objective “best value” definitions to industry 
•  Eliminate Unproductive Processes and Bureaucracy 
o Emphasize acquisition chain of command responsibility, authority 
and accountability 
o Reduce cycle times while ensuring sound investments 
o Streamline documentation requirements and staff reviews 
o Remove unproductive requirements imposed on industry 
• Promote Effective Competition 
o Create and maintain competitive environments 
o Improve DoD outreach for technology and products from global 
markets 
o Increase small business participation, including more effective use 
of market research 
• Improve Tradecraft in Acquisition of Services 
o Strengthen contract management outside the normal acquisition 
chain—installations, etc. 
o Improve requirements definition for services 
o Improve the effectiveness and productivity of contracted 
engineering and technical services 
• Improve the Professionalism of the Total Acquisition Workforce 
o Establish higher standards for key leadership positions 
o Establish stronger professional qualification requirements for all 
acquisition specialties 
o Strengthen organic engineering capabilities 
o Ensure development program leadership is technically qualified to 
manage R&D activities 
o Improve our leaders’ ability to understand and mitigate technical 
risk 
o Increase DoD support for STEM education (USD[AT&L], 2015, p. 2) 
  
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 43 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
In summary, the three USD(AT&L) BBP initiatives are focused on improving 
the acquisition process, including the critical TOC performance from development 
through disposal.  While very broadly stated, there are numerous tenets that would 
and should impact software TOC—both development and sustainment.  Many of 
these policy directives will be analyzed against the software acquisition and 
sustainment environments to illustrate some specific challenges. 
Software Acquisition Process Improvement Programs (Naegle & 
Boudreau, 2011) 
On March 21, 2003, the OSD issued a memorandum to the secretaries of the 
military departments and other selected recipients, establishing the DoD’s Software 
Acquisition Process Improvement Program and directing each Service to establish a 
similar program (OSD, 2003). 
While clearly focused on the software acquisition process, this memorandum 
established the need for a more systemic approach that would include requirements 
development, configuration management, risk management, and test and 
evaluation, as well as all relevant stakeholders.  These are all key tenets in 
designing systems with desirable TOC characteristics, and including logisticians as 
relevant stakeholders is necessary to help ensure that the Post Deployment 
Software Support (PDSS) planning produces a robust and supportable software 
architecture.  As with any other system component, the software design architecture 
will determine the supportability performance that helps drive the system’s TOC. 
A Specific Navy Initiative: Gate Reviews (Naegle & Boudreau, 2011) 
The Navy has instituted a series of reviews, termed “gate reviews” to better 
control program development cost.  The Navy Total Ownership Cost Guidebook 
(Department of the Navy [DoN], 2010; published concurrently with SECNAVINST 
5000.2E) depicts a series of 10 gate reviews that stretch across the pre-acquisition 
and acquisition phases and into the sustainment phase.  Each gate review asks 
tailored cost questions relevant to the specific life-cycle event (DoN, 2010, pp. 4–
32). The complete array of gate reviews is as follows: 
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 Gate 1—Initial Capabilities Document 
 Gate 2—Analysis of Alternatives  
 Gate 3—Capability Development Document  
 Gate 4—System Design Specification 
 Gate 5—RFP for Engineering and Manufacturing Development 
Contract 
 Gate 6 Reviews 
o Integrated Baseline Review 
o Post Critical Design Review 
o Capability Production Document 
o Pre-Full Rate Production Decision Review 
o Sustainment Sufficiency Review(s) 
At each gate review, formal design review, and assessment, programs must 
demonstrate progress toward their affordability initiatives, with strong consideration 
in mitigation or reduction of TOC.  The Navy’s intent is to change the culture from 
what the authors of this working paper perceive as a shortsighted goal of obtaining 
funds for development and procurement to the more complete perspective of total 
life-cycle cost affordability.   
 Gate Review 1, which is intended to shape the Analysis of Alternatives 
(AoA) study analysis, requires consideration of O&S costs based on 
current or similar systems.  AoA study TOC guidance is intended to be 
sufficiently detailed to inform and support the selection of a materiel 
solution from among the various AoA alternative candidates. 
 Intermediate gate reviews are coupled to existing systems engineering 
and acquisition milestone review points. These reviews become a 
forum to assess whether program trade-offs and decisions are 
controlling life-cycle cost and whether the program is continuing on the 
correct affordability azimuth.  Each of the gate reviews requires briefing 
of specific cost charts, making it unlikely that cost growth and schedule 
slippage can be obscured.  
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 The Gate 6 Sustainment Review(s), accomplished post-IOC, examine 
the warfighting system’s actual performance data compared to the 
system’s KPP thresholds and the warfighting system’s actual life-cycle 
cost compared to its prior estimates of ownership cost.  
In the aggregate, gate reviews provide for oversight and governance of 
MDAP system developments.  In a wider sense, gate reviews provide a forum for 
lessons learned regarding TOC while controlling the affordability of individual 
systems—and, hence, the broader portfolios of warfighting systems—throughout the 
developmental, production, and sustainment phases of warfighting systems. 
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System Software Development and Sustainment 
Environmental Challenges 
While many of the TOC initiatives apply equally to hardware-oriented systems 
and software-oriented systems, there are some significant differences in both the 
software development and sustainment environments that need to be considered to 
gain better software-TOC performance.  Understanding these differences in 
environments will help managers at all levels better manage the acquisition 
management system and provide the warfighter with systems that are easier and 
cheaper to sustain. 
The Software Engineering Environment (Naegle, 2015) 
The software engineering environment is not mature, especially when 
compared to hardware-centric engineering environments. Dr. Philippe Kruchten 
(2005) of the University of British Columbia remarks, “We haven’t found the 
fundamental laws of software that would play the role that the fundamental laws of 
physics play for other engineering disciplines” (p. 17). Software engineering is 
significantly unbounded because there are no physical laws that help define 
environments. There is significant evidence for software engineering immaturity, and 
it is nearly impossible to find widely accepted, industry-wide development standards, 
protocols, architectures, or formats. There is no dominant programming language, 
design and development process, standard architectures, or software engineering 
tools, which means that reusable modules and components rapidly become 
obsolete. All of these combine to make it nearly impossible to institute a widely 
accepted software reuse repository. Without significant software architecture and 
code reuse in developing software-intensive weapon systems, each development 
process essentially starts from scratch. This fact is one of the main reasons that the 
Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) and the software Technology Readiness 
Levels (TRLs) are ineffective in predicting software development risk (Naegle & 
Petross, 2007). 
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The software engineering state-of-the-practice currently is wholly dependent 
on the requirements and operational environment cues that are passed to the 
software development team. From the requirements, a software architecture is 
designed, and the requirements “flow down” through that architecture to the 
individual modules and computer software units that are to be constructed. The 
software build focuses on the requirements that flowed down to that level and the 
integration required for functionality. The standards, protocols, formats, languages, 
and tools used for the build will likely be unique to the contractor developing the 
software, and will most certainly not be universally accepted or recognized across 
the software industry. 
The software architectural design is the basis for all of the current and future 
system performance, including TOC performance, that the system will achieve, and 
the current state-of-the-practice in software engineering has each project design a 
unique architecture. Like hardware, the software design will significantly impact 
system attributes that are important to the warfighter, including TOC-oriented 
elements of maintainability, upgradability, interoperability, reliability, safety, and 
security. Most hardware-oriented engineering environments address these critical 
areas through widely accepted industry standards. For example, all DoD ground 
combat vehicles use a 24 volt, direct current, negative ground electrical system. Any 
current or future subsystem requiring vehicle power will automatically be designed to 
operate using those industry-wide electrical power standards. 
The software engineering environment is in stark contrast to even our most 
advanced hardware-centric engineering environments. For example, in the 
automotive engineering field, a design that provides for easy replacement of wear-
out items such as tires, filters, belts, and batteries obviously provides sustainability 
performance that is absolutely required. This engineering maturity helps account for 
derived and implied requirements not explicitly stated in the performance 
specification. Most performance specifications do not explicitly address this 
capability because they would be automatically considered by any competent 
provider within the mature automotive engineering environment. A mature 
engineering environment includes design elements and industry-wide standards, 
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processes, materials, and techniques to which we have grown to expect. A 
significant problem will exist if we expect the software engineering environment to 
perform the same way as other, more mature engineering fields (Naegle & Petross, 
2007). 
As the example above illustrates, many system TOC elements are often 
standardized across hardware-oriented engineering environments due to the 
maturity of the sector’s engineering maturity. Without the engineering maturity, 
software sustainability performance and expectations must be specified as part of 
the requirements generation process. The capabilities-based user requirements and 
performance-based acquisition requirements are specifically not designed to provide 
that level of specificity. 
The Software Engineering Environment Challenge 
The DoD’s acquisition management system is designed to garner innovation 
from the commercial marketplace by leveraging the mature engineering 
environments present in most disciplines.  The DoD develops its requirements 
beginning with the capabilities-based language provided by the users, then 
translating them into performance-based language for the RFP.  This requirements 
generation system is purposely designed to allow the maximum contractor flexibility 
in satisfying the warfighter’s needs. 
Within the immature software engineering environment, this requirements 
generation process creates an opportunity for significant misinterpretation, and 
derived and implied requirements that are not addressed, all resulting in 
requirements creep that fuels cost increases and schedule slippage.  Unlike mature 
hardware-oriented engineering environments, where the widely accepted industry 
standards will be employed whether or not they are specified, with software, you get 
what you specify and very little else (Naegle, 2015, p. 13). 
Addressing the Challenge 
There are several necessary steps to effectively address the immature 
software engineering environment challenge: 
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1. The acquisition community must understand that the software engineering 
environment is different, and not mature.  This must be an essential part of 
Knowledge Point 1 and of the Navy gate reviews 1 through 5, detailed 
earlier.  The BBP memoranda help support this step by its direction to 
“improve the professionalism of the total acquisition workforce.” 
2. The acquisition community must take active steps to compensate for the 
software immature engineering environment. 
a. Requirements.  Fully develop all requirements so that derived and 
implied requirements are specified.  Sustainment performance 
including maintainability, upgradability, interoperability, reliability, 
and safety/security must be specified to improve TOC attributes.  
With software development, you get what you ask for and very little 
else. 
b. Operational context.  Provide context for the requirements beyond 
what is provided in the typical OMS/MP.  Software engineers need 
to understand how the system will be used and maintained, how it 
will be modified and interfaced in the future, which features are 
critical and which are non-critical enhancers, and how the user 
expects the system to operate under stressful conditions at the 
limits of the operational envelope.  All of this required information is 
not available from any other source, and certainly not available in 
the software engineering environment. 
3. The acquisition community must drive and monitor the software 
architectural design process to a much greater extent than what is needed 
for hardware-centric system.  This is an essential function to reach 
Knowledge Point 2, and you literally could not achieve Knowledge Point 2 
without the ability to drive the software architectural design.  This would 
also be an essential function to effectively pass through the Navy gate 
reviews 4 through 6. 
Estimating Software Size and Cost  
Estimating the software size is essential to estimating development and 
sustainment costs.  Unfortunately, estimating size is difficult for any software-
intensive effort, and nearly impossible for unprecedented development efforts, 
including many DoD weapon systems.  The DoD often seeks cutting-edge 
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technologies pursuing dominant capabilities, driving the need for developing 
unprecedented software development. 
The Estimating Software Size and Cost Challenge 
Estimating software size, especially for a cutting-edge weapon system, is 
challenging, at best.  It is, however,  essential for understanding both software 
developmental and sustainment costs, so is critical to understanding TOC.  
Software Size Estimating is an important activity in software 
engineering that is used to estimate the size of an application or 
component in order to be able to implement other program 
management activities such as cost estimation or schedule progress.  
The software engineer is responsible for generating independent 
estimates of the software size throughout the life cycle. These 
estimates are sometimes expressed as Software Lines of Code 
(SLOC), Function Points (FP), or Equivalent Software Lines of Code 
(ESLOC). An effective software estimate provides the information 
needed to design a workable Software Development Plan (SDP). This 
estimate is also input to the Cost Analysis Requirements Description 
(CARD) process. (“Software Management,” n.d. p. 1) 
The U.S. Air Force has published a guide for weapon system software 
development management and describes the software estimating challenge as 
follows: 
Weapon system acquisition programs routinely aim to develop and 
deliver unprecedented warfighting capability.  This unprecedented 
capability is often realized by developing complex, SIS [software 
intensive system] or integrating existing systems and subsystems with 
other equally complex systems in new ways.  Since acquisition 
programs are planned and estimated when only top-level performance 
requirements are available, it is extremely difficult to develop high 
confidence estimates and align expectations early in the program life 
cycle.  Such early estimates are relatively subjective, involve numerous 
assumptions, and are almost always optimistic since the engineering 
activities that result in a complete understanding of the work to be 
accomplished have not been completed.  This complete understanding 
typically does not mature until well into the design phase, and when it 
does, it usually confirms that initial estimates were optimistic, key 
assumptions (such as significant reuse) cannot be achieved, more 
work than planned needs to be done, and the amount of software that 
has to be developed and/or integrated is growing. (SecAF, 2008, p. 7) 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 52 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Both the AcqNotes website and the Air Force Guidebook offer some guidance 
in estimating the amount of software that needs to be developed, which is not the 
only factor in the development cost, but certainly one of the most important.  
The AcqNotes website recommends the following:  
There are various ways available to the software engineer to develop a size 
estimate. It is recommended that multiple techniques be used and the results 
combined to produce the final size estimate. Methods that can be used of 
estimating size are: 
• Comparable to existing programs: Compare the proposed functionality and 
other similarities to existing programs. If the proposed program has 20% more 
functionality than one program and 15% less than another, a fairly accurate 
estimate can be achieved using the actual sizes from the existing programs. 
• Historical data: Within a program, historical data of previous developments 
(estimates and actual) may exist. Since many of the parameters are usually 
the same (developer team, environment, platform, etc.) this is a good method 
to compare previous software builds and the proposed code. The more data 
that is used will increase the accuracy. 
• Contractor estimate: It is generally true the contractor has written software 
similar previously. They often maintain a database of past efforts (estimates 
and actual) and can produce a very accurate estimate. Since the contractor 
and the Government have different objectives, their estimate should never be 
relied on solely. 
• Expert judgment (Delphi technique): Engineers that have domain 
experience and knowledge can often accurately estimate the software size. 
Without extensive experience however, expert judgment is seldom more 
accurate than guessing. 
• Level of effort or schedule: This method does not really estimate the size to 
be developed, but rather defines the most that could be developed given 
unchangeable level of effort or schedule constraints.  The software engineer 
uses productivity rates, integration time and software defect data from 
recently delivered programs to define the maximum size that could be 
developed. (“Software Management,” n.d., p. 1) 
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The Air Force guidebook also has recommended considerations for 
estimating software size: 
The software estimating process consists of a series of activities that 
include estimating size of the software to be developed, modified, or 
reused; applying estimating models and techniques; and analyzing, 
crosschecking, and reporting the results. The following steps should be 
considered as part of any software estimating process:  
 Develop a notional architecture for the system, and identify program 
requirements likely to be satisfied by software.  
 Identify potential COTS, GOTS, and other sources of NDI software.  
 Identify existing software that will be modified, including the size of the 
overall software as well as the size of the expected modifications.  
 Identify software that will be newly developed for this program to 
provide functionality not available from existing software, or to 
adapt/integrate all the necessary software components.  
 Obtain software size information for all software elements, where size 
is carefully defined and measured in one of the two standard software 
size measures: non-comment source lines of code (SLOC) or function 
points.  
 Assess the uncertainty in the new and modified software sizes, based 
on historical data (if available) and engineering judgment.  
 Assess the uncertainty associated with the reusability of existing 
software (COTS, GOTS, and NDI) in the context of the program (see 
section 3.2.4). Estimate the trade studies, familiarization, and the 
integration and testing efforts required to accommodate the unmodified 
reused code.  
 Account for software complexity and the proposed development 
approach/processes, and assess any overlaps in software builds.  
 Be realistic about expected software productivity and any assumption 
of significantly higher than historical productivity due to applying the 
best people, improved/more efficient processes, or new and improved 
development tools. Past performance, where actual size, cost, and 
same program or a very analogous program, should be heavily 
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weighted. It is rare to have the A-team people for a long-duration 
embedded system development, and new processes and tools often 
fall short of expectations.  
 Apply growth factors to new/modified and reuse software, based on 
past experience and the level of uncertainty.  
 Account for all remaining uncertainties as estimate risks (see section 
3.2.2).  
 Ensure the estimate includes software support to systems engineering, 
system and sub-system requirements definition, configuration 
management, quality assurance, program management, system 
integration, and system test as appropriate.  
 Address the software development life-cycle from software 
requirements analysis through software-related system integration and 
testing. The chosen modeling/estimation approach may not address 
the entire software effort since some commercial parametric models 
focus on the period starting with the baseline set of software 
requirements and ending with a fully integrated and tested 
subsystem/functional software product ready for software/hardware 
integration and test. Estimate and include any additional effort required 
to develop, allocate, and analyze the subsystem and software 
requirements; perform software to hardware (subsystem) integration 
and test; and perform system integration and test.  
 Crosscheck estimate results with other methods such as other models, 
expert advice, rules of thumb, and historical productivity.  
 Improve the estimate over time. (SecAF, 2008, pp. 27 & 28) 
 
Both the AcqNotes and U.S. Air Force size estimating guidance suggest 
using multiple methodologies to form  a more informed estimate of the likely 
software size of a developmental system.  Nearly all of the guidance is dependent 
on an excellent understanding of the system requirements and operational context. 
One common method to estimate the software size on a new developmental 
program is to use the analogy method, that is, to compare the new system to a 
similar system that was recently developed, assuming that the software will be 
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similar in overall size.  The following is the first bullet in the AcqNotes software 
estimating guidance detailed previously in this section.  It seems a logical approach, 
but has not proven particularly accurate in recent history: 
The premise is that the existing system’s architecture, complexity, and 
functions are similar enough to fairly accurately predict the software 
development resources required for the new system. Unfortunately, this 
technique has proven to be ineffective as evidenced by the F-22 Raptor 
development and the follow-on F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) effort. 
The two high-performance, supersonic aircraft, have overlapping 
missions, are significantly similar, and are both developed by the same 
contractor. The F-22 would seem to be a very good predictor of the F-35 
software development effort with the SwTRL [Software Technology 
Readiness Level] model, but it clearly was not: 
The lines of code necessary for the JSF’s capabilities have now grown 
to over 24 million—9.5 million on board the aircraft. By comparison, JSF 
has about 3 times more on-board software lines of code than the F-22A 
Raptor and 6 times more than the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet. This has 
added work and increased the overall complexity of the effort. The 
software on-board the aircraft and needed for operations has grown 37 
percent since the critical design review in 2005. … Almost half of the on-
board software has yet to complete integration and test—typically the 
most challenging phase of software development. (GAO, 2012, p. 11) 
The report goes on to state that typical software size growth in DoD 
systems development ranges from 30% to 100%.  
JSF design changes were originally supposed to taper off and be 
completed by January 2014. Actual design changes through September 
2011 failed to taper off and continue at a significantly high rate. The 
projections in the GAO (2012) report indicated that the revised design 
change projections would continue and actually grow in number, until 
January 2019 (p. 16). Given this level of redesign, the software and 
system complexity growth are likely to continue. (Naegle, 2015) 
The second bullet guidance from AcqNotes indicates that the use of historical 
data may be useful in estimating a new system’s software size.  This is particularly 
challenging for the DoD as the new weapon systems the DoD often pursues have 
capabilities or features that are unprecedented (cutting-edge technologies).  
Certainly, there will be many subsystems in which historical data may be a good 
predictor for software size in existing, identical, or similar subsystems.  However, the 
analogy method uses the historical data of a similar system as a surrogate for actual 
historical data, but suffers the challenges detailed previously. 
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The third AcqNotes bullet is “contractor estimates for software size.”  The 
problem with contractor estimates is that the size estimate is needed far before a 
development contractor would be involved in the process.  Of course, market 
research contractors could be used to garner “contractor estimates,” but this would 
require two essential preconditions.  First, the market research contractor would 
need an extraordinary amount of requirements, operational context, and design 
detail on the proposed system to be able to provide to the marketplace to garner 
reasonably accurate software size estimates.  Second, the market research would 
be conducted with industry members who can only respond to the information 
provided, so the estimates are only as accurate as the requirements-oriented 
information provided.  In addition, the surveyed companies may be unwilling to 
provide much detail about their estimate as it could provide competitors with 
valuable competitive information. 
The expert judgement, or Delphi Method (AcqNotes bullet 4), depends on the 
level of expertise of the engineers providing the estimate and their total 
understanding of the system to be developed.  The DoD may gain access to expert 
software engineers that are inside the Government or through contracting for such 
expertise, but the level of understanding is dependent on the requirements 
generations system and the operational context provided. 
There are also numerous parametric models, like Barry Boehm’s Constructive 
Cost Model (COCOMO), that may be used in an attempt to estimate effort and cost 
(USC, 2002).  COCOMO, like other estimating models, requires a software size 
estimate to be used.  One of the inputs to the model is the Annual Change Traffic 
(ACT), or the percentage of the software that needs to be accessed for sustainability 
purposes.  Obviously, the model would need to know the software size to perform 
the percentage calculations.   
Because of all of the variables that are needed for the models, they can be 
quite misleading.  For example, the University of Southern California (USC) used the 
models and then compared actual results to those estimated.  They found that 
COCOMO “demonstrates an accuracy of within 20% of actuals 46% of the time for 
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effort, and within 20% of actuals 48% of the time for a nonincremental development 
schedule” (USC, 2002).  They found that, with more initial data input, the model 
accuracy improved to 30% of actuals 75% of the time.  Boehm himself stated that “a 
software cost estimation model is doing well if it can estimate software development 
costs within 20% of the actual costs, 70% of the time, and on its home turf (that is, 
within the class of projects to which it is calibrated)” (SecAF, 2008, p. 21). 
Obviously, using the results of parametric models alone would not result in 
the accurate estimates required by the DoD.  The BBP memoranda specify “would 
cost” and “should cost” estimates that the models simply could not accurately 
produce.  The software development cost and schedule estimate would necessarily 
need to be sufficiently accurate to avoid a Nunn-McCurdy violation in a software-
intensive system development program. 
Addressing the Challenge 
Obviously, a fairly accurate software size estimate is necessary to predict 
both developmental and sustainment costs on a new system, and it is clear that 
obtaining an accurate size estimate is significantly challenging.  The necessary 
precursor to software estimation is described earlier in this paper as compensating 
for the immature software engineering environment.  Without more clearly defined 
requirements and operational context, accurately estimating software size is nearly 
impossible. 
As suggested in both the AcqNotes and U.S. Air Force software estimating 
guidelines, a multi-faceted approach is needed.  To be successful, each approach 
must be completed with significant discipline and rigorous systems analysis that 
goes beyond the current practices.  If successful, the software size estimate will help 
predict both developmental and sustainment software costs. 
Software Sustainability Architecture  
A system’s architecture and sustainability performance are strongly linked.  
As the F/A 18 engine removal example provided earlier illustrates, the airframe 
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architecture was carefully designed to allow the 20-minute engine removal.  Likely, 
this feature was engineered in response to some specific requirements language. 
As introduced earlier, much of the design priority has been delegated to the 
contractor as the requirements language is capabilities-based on the user side and 
performance-based on the program management side.  The DoD is responsible for 
driving the architectural design through the performance-based specification 
language, which requires a very in-depth understanding and development of the 
requirements passed on to the contractor.   
The Software Architecture Challenge 
Driving the software architectural design towards improved system TOC 
performance has numerous and complex challenges.  The DoD requirements 
generation process is designed around the premise that the commercial marketplace 
has solutions for achieving the system performance specified by the DoD.  This 
philosophy came from the acquisition reforms of the ’90s, when systems were much 
more hardware oriented, and the associated engineering environments were mature.  
As the DoD has moved to software-oriented systems, the philosophy did not change, 
even though the software engineering environment is not mature.  This has created 
a significant mismatch in what the DoD communicates and what it expects to be 
delivered.  Much of the mismatch can be linked to the software engineering 
immaturity: 
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The lack of software engineering maturity impacts both requirements 
development and design of the architecture. To compensate for the 
relative immaturity of the software engineering environment, the DOD 
must conduct significantly more in-depth requirements analysis and 
provide potential software developers detailed performance 
specifications in all areas of software performance and sustainability. 
This is a significantly different mind-set than the hardware-dominated 
systems acquisition of the past. 
In addition to the performance requirements, software architectures 
must be similarly shaped to include system attributes expected by the 
warfighter. Many DOD user representatives and acquisition 
professionals have grown accustom to the engineering maturity levels 
offered by the hardware-oriented systems that dominated past 
acquisitions. Providing the system requirements in the same fashion 
may not drive the architecture for needed attributes. As demonstrated 
by the F-35 JSF redesign problems, changing software architectures 
during the development cycle will likely be costly in terms of schedule 
and funding. (Naegle, 2014, p. 14) 
The DoD also provides the top levels of the work breakdown structure (WBS) 
to provide cues to the necessary design structures, but like the requirements 
generation process, the communication through the WBS is often too vague or 
lacking in necessary detail for the software engineers to understand important 
aspects of the design. 
The Department of Defense Handbook: Work Breakdown Structures 
for Defense Materiel Items (MIL-HDBK-881A) recommends a minimum 
of three levels be developed before handoff to a contractor (DoD, 
2005). If a program is expected to be high-cost or high-risk, it is critical 
to define the system at a lower level of the WBS (DoD, 2005, p. 3). 
Complex weapon systems are nearly always high-cost, and the 
complex software development that these systems require almost 
always means that the development effort is high-risk as well. The 
WBS and performance specification must, consequently, be 
significantly more developed to provide the software engineer enough 
information and insight to accurately estimate the level of effort 
needed—cost and schedule—and to actually produce the capabilities 
needed by the warfighter. Contracts resulting from proposals that are 
based on underdeveloped, vague, or missing requirements typically 
result in catastrophic cost and schedule growth as the true demands of 
the software development effort are discovered only after contract 
award. (Naegle, 2014, p. 8) 
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The design metrics are very important to ensure that the software architecture 
is meeting the warfighter needs and expectations for the new system, including the 
TOC performance.  Too often, this process serves to identify missing requirements 
or clarify vague requirements, causing significant requirements creep impacting the 
cost and schedule. 
Addressing the Challenge 
Again, step one for addressing the software architecture challenge is to 
understand that the software engineering environment is immature and that the DoD 
front-end processes must help compensate for that immaturity.  The requirements 
generation process, the Operational Mode Summary/Mission Profile (OMS/MP), the 
WBS, and the resulting performance specification and Government-specified 
functional architecture (top levels of the WBS) must drive the software engineer to 
develop the detailed system architecture to the total needs of the warfighter.  The 
software engineering environment will not compensate for vague or missing 
requirements and there are virtually no industry-wide standards for sustainability.   
Processes to both drive the software architecture and monitor the design 
activities is unlike the contractor’s hardware architecture activities and significantly 
more critical.  Fifty percent or more of the software effort is expended in 
requirements and architectural design, which is far greater than typical hardware-
oriented systems.  This means that half or more of the software development 
resources have been used by the Preliminary Design Review (PDR), which occurs 
quite early in the developmental process.  Requirements creep and software 
changes after the PDR are significantly disruptive to the design process and are 
costly in both funding and schedule.  In addition, changes occurring after the design 
is complete are typically accommodated through the use of software patches.  While 
these patches may function adequately, they typically weaken the software structure 
and add difficulty to the sustainment effort as they add lines of code, are not 
generally well documented, and add complexity to problem analyses in the deployed 
system. 
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Software Sustainment Activities 
The Post Deployment Software Support (PDSS) structure—maintainers, 
software engineering tools, documentation, licenses, and so forth—must all be 
funded and in place at the initial deployment as software maintenance will likely be 
required immediately due to the complexity.  As demonstrated in Figure 3, most of 
the DoD software sustainment effort is accomplished through Contracted Logistics 
Support (CLS) strategies, so the support contracts are critical to system deployment. 
As with hardware-oriented systems, the software sustainability performance is 
significantly defined by the system architecture.  The software engineering 
immaturity means that there are no industry-wide standards for software 
sustainability, so the DoD must drive the desired sustainability performance into the 
software design. 
The two major components that help determine a system’s software 
sustainment cost are software size (SLOC count) and complexity.  Many of the effort 
estimating tools need the software size to estimate the number of software 
maintainers that need to be dedicated to the sustainment effort.  Complexity factors 
are then added into the calculations. 
The Software Sustainment Challenge 
The DoD system acquisition process is driven through the performance-
based specifications, program WBS functional architectural cues, and high-level 
OMS/MP and, therefore, relies heavily on the contractor’s expertise backed by the 
industry’s mature engineering environments.  This process is not adequate for 
driving the software architecture to a sustainable design as the immature software 
engineering environment has no industry-wide standards for sustainability, so 
software sustainability performance must be totally driven through the DoD front-end 
processes. 
Unlike even the most sophisticated hardware system, the software 
maintainers must have the same skill sets as the design engineers, and so the DoD 
is typically contracting for software engineers to maintain the software.  The software 
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sustainment cost factors include maintainers, software tools, license fees, and 
associated contract costs for most DoD systems.  While the non-personnel costs 
can be considerable, the cost of the maintainers is usually the largest part of the 
sustainment cost because the DoD is typically contracting for software engineers to 
maintain the software components.  
The events driving the need for software maintenance are not always within 
the control of the system’s PM, as demonstrated with the M1 Abrams tank example, 
provided earlier.  As the DoD continues to network platforms into Systems of 
Systems (SoSs), each platform is subject to the network’s complexities and 
interoperability requirements.   
Addressing the Challenge 
The solutions for addressing the software sustainability challenge are rooted 
in solving the other issues presented in this section, as they all tend to build on one 
another.  The DoD needs to recognize that the software engineering environment is 
immature, significantly different than the hardware-oriented engineering 
environments.  That immaturity renders much of the DoD front-end processes 
ineffective for software-intensive systems, so active steps augmenting the standard 
acquisition processes must be taken to compensate. 
TOC performance is being influenced by the ever increasing software 
functionality of DoD systems, so improving TOC performance means effectively 
addressing software development and sustainability costs.  The software costs and 
performance are dependent on how effective the acquisition front-end processes 
address them, and the standard DoD acquisition management system appears to be 
insufficient for the software components. 
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Software Initiatives Addressing TOC 
The software TOC issues presented, and their underlying causes, call for 
supplementary Systems Engineering Process (SEP) tools, techniques, and analyses 
to be applied to the DoD acquisition process.  The following sections describe 
recommended tools, techniques, and analyses that would help address the issues 
presented.  All of these are designed to work within the Defense Acquisition System 
(DAS). 
Controls on Software Development (Naegle & Boudreau, 2011) 
1. Driving the Software Requirements and Architectures for System 
Supportability 
While the tools and techniques described in this section were designed for the 
software components, they would be just as effective for any non-software 
component because they are Systems Engineering (SE) oriented.  The SEP focus 
used does not attempt to separate software from other components, so all system 
components would benefit from using these tools and techniques. 
a. Software Supportability Analysis 
As with hardware system components, software supportability attributes must 
be designed into the system architecture.  Many hardware-oriented engineering 
fields are now quite mature, so that a number of supportability attributes would be 
automatically included in any competent design, even if they were not specified by 
the user community.  For example, the state of maturity for the automotive 
engineering field means that, in any automotive-related program, there would be 
supportability designs allowing for routine maintenance of system filters, lubricants, 
tires, brakes, batteries, and other normal wear-out items.  There are few, if any, 
corresponding supportability design attributes that would be automatically included 
in even the best software construct.  Virtually all of the software supportability 
attributes required must be explicitly specified because they would not likely be 
included in the design architecture without clearly stated requirements.  With 
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software, you get what you specify and very little else.  So how does one ensure that 
required software supportability attributes are not overlooked? 
Logistics Supportability Analysis (LSA), performed extremely early, is one of 
the keys for developing the system supportability attributes needed and expected by 
the warfighter.  The F/A 18 Super Hornet aircraft was designed for higher reliability 
and improved ease of maintenance compared to its predecessors (“F/A 18,” n.d.) 
because of warfighter needs for generating combat power in the form of aircraft 
sorties available.  The LSA performed on the F/A 18 determined that a design 
fostering higher reliability and faster maintenance turnaround time (the engines are 
attached to the airframe at 10 locations and can be changed in about 20 minutes by 
a four-man team) would result in more aircraft being available to the commander 
when needed.  The concept for software LSA is no different, but implementing sound 
supportability analyses on the software components has been spotty, at best, and 
completely lacking, at worst. 
To assist in effective software LSA, a focus on these elements is key:  
Maintainability, Upgradeability, Interoperability/Interfaces, Reliability, and Safety & 
Security—MUIRS.  
Maintainability 
The amount of elapsed time between initial fielding and the first required 
software maintenance action can probably be measured in hours, not days.  The 
effectiveness and efficiency of these required maintenance actions is dependent on 
several factors, but the software architecture that was developed from the 
performance specifications provided is critical.  The DoD must influence the software 
architecture through the performance specification process to minimize the cost and 
time required to perform essential maintenance tasks. 
Maintenance is one area in which software is fundamentally different from 
hardware.  Software is one of the very few components in which we know that the 
fielded product has shortcomings, and we field it anyway.  There are a number of 
reasons why this happens; for instance, there is typically not enough time, funding, 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 65 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
or resources to find and correct every error, glitch, or bug, and not all of these are 
worth the effort of correcting.  Knowing this, there must be a sound plan and 
resources immediately available to quickly correct those shortcomings that do 
surface during testing and especially those that arise during warfighting operations.  
Even when the system software is operating well, changes and upgrades in other 
interfaced hardware and software systems will drive some sort of software 
maintenance action to the system software. In other words, there will be a 
continuous need for software maintenance in the planned complex SoS architecture 
envisioned for net-centric warfare.   
Because the frequency of required software maintenance actions is going to 
be much higher than in other systems, the cost to perform these tasks is likely to be 
higher as well.  One of the reasons for this is that software is not maintained by 
”maintainers,” as are most hardware systems, but is maintained by the same type of 
people that originally developed it—software engineers.  These engineers will be 
needed immediately upon fielding, and a number will be needed throughout the 
lifespan of the system to perform maintenance, add capabilities, and upgrade the 
system. There are several models available to estimate the number of software 
engineers that will be needed for support; planning for funding these resources must 
begin very early in the process.  Because the DoD has a very limited capability for 
supporting software internally, early software support is typically provided by the 
original developer and is included in the RFP and proposal for inclusion into the 
contract or as a follow-on Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) contract. 
Upgradeability  
A net-centric environment composed of numerous systems developed in an 
evolutionary acquisition model will create an environment of almost continuous 
change as each system upgrades its capabilities over time.  System software will 
have to accommodate the changes and will have to, in turn, be upgraded to leverage 
the consistently added capabilities.  The software architecture design will play a 
major role in how effective and efficient capabilities upgrades are implemented, so 
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communicating the known, anticipated, and likely system upgrades will impact how 
the software developer designs the software for known and unknown upgrades. 
Trying to anticipate upgrade requirements for long-lived systems is extremely 
challenging to materiel developers, but is well worth their effort.  Unanticipated 
software changes in the operational support phase cost 50 to 200 times the cost in 
early design, so any software designed to accommodate an upgrade that is never 
realized costs virtually nothing when compared to changing software later for a 
capability that could have been anticipated.  For example, the Army Tactical Missile 
System (ATACMS) Unitary was a requirement to modify the missile from warhead 
air delivery to surface detonation—that is, flying the warhead to the ground.  The 
contract award for the modification was $119 million. The warhead was not new 
technology, nor particularly challenging to integrate with the missile body.  The vast 
majority of this cost was to reengineer the software to guide the missile to the 
surface.  Had there been an upgrade requirement for this type of mission in the 
original performance specification, this original cost (including potential upgrades, 
even if there were 10 other upgrade requirements that were never applied) would 
have been a fraction of this modification cost. 
Interfaces/Interoperability 
OA design focuses on the strict control of interfaces to ensure the maximum 
flexibility in adding or changing system modules, whether they are hardware or 
software in nature.  This presupposes that the system modules are known—which 
seems logical, as most hardware modules are well-defined and bounded by both 
physics and mature engineering standards.  In sharp contrast to hardware, software 
modularity is not bounded by physics, and there are very few software industry 
standards for the modular architecture in software components.  This is yet another 
area in which the software developer needs much more information about 
operational, maintenance, reliability, safety, and security performance requirements, 
as well as current, planned, and potential system upgrades.  These requirements, 
once well-defined and clearly communicated, will drive the developer to design a 
software modular architecture supporting OA performance goals.  For example, if a 
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system uses a Global Positioning System (GPS) signal, it is likely that the GPS will 
change over the life of the system.  Knowing this, the software developer creates a 
corresponding discrete software module that is much easier and less expensive to 
interface, change, and upgrade as the GPS system does so. 
With the system software modular architecture developed, the focus returns 
to the interfaces between hardware and software modules, as well as to the external 
interfaces needed for the desired interoperability of the net-centric force.  Software 
is, of course, one of the essential enablers for interoperability and provides a 
powerful tool for interfacing systems, including systems that were not designed to 
work together.  Software performing the function of “middleware” allows legacy and 
other dissimilar systems to interoperate.  Obviously, this interoperation provides a 
significant advantage, but it comes with a cost in the form of maintainability, 
resources, and system complexity.  As software interfaces with other components 
and actually performs the interface function, controlling it and ensuring the interfaces 
provide the desired OA capability becomes a major software-management and 
software-discipline challenge.   
One method being employed by the DoD attempts to control the critical 
interfaces through a set of parameters or protocols rather than through active 
management of the network and network environment.  This method falls short on 
several levels.  It fails to understand and control the effects of aggregating all of the 
systems in a net-centric scheme.  For instance, each individual system may meet all 
protocols for bandwidth, but when all systems are engaged on the network, all 
bandwidth requirements are aggregated on the network—overloading the total 
bandwidth available for all systems.  In addition, members of the Software 
Engineering Institute (SEI) noted, 
While these standards may present a step in the right direction, they 
are limited in the extent to which they facilitate interoperability.  At best, 
they define a minimal infrastructure that consists of products and other 
standards on which systems can be based.  They do not define the 
common message semantics, operational protocols, and system 
execution scenarios that are needed for interoperation.  They should 
not be considered system architectures.  For example, the C4ISR 
domain-specific information (within the JTA) identifies acceptable 
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standards for fiber channels and radio transmission interfaces, but 
does not specify the common semantics of messages to be 
communicated between C4ISR systems, nor does it define an 
architecture for a specific C4ISR system or set of systems. (Morris, 
Levine, Meyers, Place, & Plakosh, 2004, p. 38) 
Clearly, understanding and controlling the interfaces is critical for effective 
interoperation at both the system and SoS levels.  The individual PM must actively 
manage all systems’ interfaces impacting OA performance, and a network PM must 
do the same for the critical network interfaces.  Due to this necessity of constant 
management, a parameters-and-protocols approach to net-centric OA performance 
is unlikely to produce the capabilities and functionality expected by the warfighter. 
Understanding the software interfaces begins with the software architecture; 
controlling the interfaces is a unique challenge encompassing the need to integrate 
legacy and dissimilar systems and the lack of software interface standards within the 
existing software engineering environment.  As stated earlier, the architecture needs 
to be driven through detailed performance specifications, which will help define the 
interfaces to be controlled.  An effective method for controlling the interfaces is to 
intensely manage a well-defined Interface Control Document (ICD), which should be 
a Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL) deliverable on any software-intensive or 
networked system.  
Reliability 
While the need for highly reliable weapon systems is obvious, the impact on 
total system reliability of integrating complex software components is not so obvious.  
Typically, as system complexity increases, maintaining system reliability becomes 
more of a challenge.  Add the complexity of effectively networking an SoS (all of 
which are individually complex) to a critical warfighting capability that is constantly 
evolving over time, and reliability becomes daunting. 
Once again, the software developer must have an understanding of reliability 
requirements before crafting the software architecture and developing the software 
applications.  Highly reliable systems often require redundant capability, and this 
holds true for software components as well.  In addition, software problems tend to 
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propagate, resulting in a degradation of system reliability over time.  For example, a 
Malaysian Airlines Boeing 777 suffered several flight control problems resulting in 
the following: a near-stall situation, contradicting instrument indications, false 
warnings, and difficulty controlling the aircraft in both autopilot and manual flight 
modes.  The problems were traced to software in an air data inertial reference unit 
that was feeding erroneous data to the aircraft’s primary flight computer (PFC), 
which is used in both autopilot and manual flight modes.  The PFC continued to try 
to correct for the erroneous data received, adjusting flight control surfaces in all 
modes of flight, displaying indications that the aircraft was approaching stall speed 
and overspeed limits simultaneously, and causing wind shear alarms to sound close 
to landing (Dornheim, 2005, p. 46).  It is critical for system reliability that the software 
developers understand how outputs from software applications are used by 
interfaced systems so that appropriate reliability safeguards can be engineered into 
the developed software.   
Software that freezes or shuts down the system when an anomaly occurs is 
certainly not reliable nor acceptable for critical weapon systems, yet these 
characteristics are prevalent in commercially based software systems.  Mission 
reliability is a function of the aggregation of the system’s subcomponent reliability, so 
every software subcomponent is contributing to or detracting from that reliability.  
The complexity of software makes understanding all failure modes nearly 
impossible, but there are many techniques that software developers can employ 
when designing the architecture and engineering the applications to improve the 
software component reliability.  Once requirements are clearly communicated to the 
developers, the software can be engineered with redundancy or “safe mode” 
capabilities to vastly improve mission reliability when anomalies occur.  The key is 
identifying the reliability requirements and making them clear to the software 
developers. 
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Safety & Security 
Very few software applications have the required safety margins associated 
with critical weapon systems used by warfighters in combat situations—where they 
are depending on these margins for their survival.  Typically, the software 
developers have only a vague idea of what their software is doing and how critical 
that function is to the warfighter employing the weapon system.  Safety performance 
must be communicated to the software developers from the beginning of 
development so they understand the link between software functionality and 
systems safety.  For example, suppose a smart munition senses that it does not 
have control of a critical directional component, and it calculates that it cannot hit the 
intended target.  The next set of instructions the software provides to the 
malfunctioning system may well be critical to the safety of friendly troops, so 
software developers must have the necessary understanding of operational safety to 
decide how to code the software for what will happen next.   
Software safety is clearly linked with reliability since software that is more 
reliable is inherently safer.  It is critical that the software developer understands how 
the warfighter expects the software to operate in abnormal situations, in degraded 
modes, and when inputs are outside of expected values.  Much commercially based 
software simply ceases to function under these conditions or gives error messages 
that supersede whatever function was being performed, none of which are 
acceptable in combat operations. 
With software performing so many critical functions, there is little doubt that 
software applications are a prime target for anyone opposing U.S. and Allied forces.  
Critical weapon system and networking software must be resistant to hacking, 
spoofing, mimicking, and all other manner of attack.  There must be capabilities for 
isolating attacks and portions of networks that have been compromised without 
losing the ability to continue operations in critical combat situations.  The software 
developer must know that all of these capabilities are essential before he or she 
constructs software architectures and software programs, as this knowledge will be 
very influential for the software design and application development.  The Software 
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Engineering Institute’s Quality Attribute Workshop states, “As an example, consider 
security.  It is difficult, maybe even impossible, to add effective security to a system 
as an afterthought.  Component as well as communication mechanisms and paths 
must be designed or selected early in the lifecycle to satisfy security requirements” 
(Barbacci et al., 2003, p. 2). 
Interoperability challenges are increased when the SoS has the type of 
security requirements needed by the DoD.  Legacy systems and existing security 
protocols will likely need to be considered before other security architecture can be 
effectively designed.  OA capabilities will be hampered by the critical need for 
security; both must be carefully balanced to optimize system performance and 
security.  This balance of OA and security must be managed by the DoD and not the 
software developer. 
Physical security schemes and operating procedures will also have an impact 
on the software architecture.  For example, many communication security 
(COMSEC) devices need only routine security until the keys, usually software 
programs, are applied; then, much more stringent security procedures are 
implemented.  Knowledge of this security feature would be a key requirement of the 
developer; he or she must understand how and when the critical software pieces are 
uploaded to the COMSEC device.  The same holds true for weapon systems that 
upload sensitive mission data just prior to launch. 
Residual software on equipment or munitions that could fall into enemy hands 
presents another type of security challenge that needs to be addressed during the 
application development.  For example, the ATACMS missile air-delivers some of its 
warheads, leaving the missile body to freefall to the surface.  It is very conceivable 
that the body could be intact and, of course, unsecured.  If critical mission software 
was still within the body and found by enemy forces, valuable information might be 
gleaned from knowing how the system finds its targets.  The Government would 
certainly want the developer to design the applications in a way that would make 
anything recovered useless to the enemy, but this is a capability that is not intuitive 
to the software developers (Naegle, 2006, pp. 17–25).   
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Effective Software Development Tools Supporting System TOC 
Analyses 
1. Software Engineering Institute’s Quality Attribute Workshop  
The Quality Attribute Workshop (QAW) is designed to help identify a complete 
(or as complete as possible) inventory of system software requirements through 
analysis of system quality attributes.  One of the intents is to develop the derived 
and implied requirements from the user-stated requirements, which is a necessary 
step when user-stated requirements are provided in terms of capabilities needed as 
prescribed by the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) 
process.  A system’s TOC, and those elements that contribute to TOC, are system 
quality attributes.  Although obviously important to the warfighter, the associated 
operations and support, training/education, and facility costs are rarely addressed in 
much detail and need to be derived from stated requirements or augmented with 
implied requirements through the QAW process, or something similar.  
The QAW helps provide a facilitating framework and process designed to 
more fully develop the derived and implied requirements that are critical to clearly 
communicate to potential contractors and software developers.  Including a robust 
LSA process using the MUIRS focus elements, described previously, within the 
QAW process will likely significantly improve requirements analysis for those 
associated TOC elements and vastly improve the accuracy of system TOC 
projections.  While improving the system requirements development, QAW is 
designed to work with another SEI process called the Architectural Tradeoff Analysis 
MethodologySM (ATAMSM) to further improve the understanding of the system for 
potential contractors and software developers. 
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SEI’s Architectural Tradeoff Analysis MethodologySM  
The Software Engineering Institute’s Architectural Tradeoff Analysis 
MethodologySM (ATAMSM) is an architectural analysis tool designed to evaluate 
design decisions based on the quality attribute requirements of the system being 
developed.  The methodology is a process for determining whether the quality 
attributes, including TOC attributes, are achievable by the architecture as it has been 
conceived before enormous resources have been committed to that design.  One of 
the main goals is to gain insight into how the quality attributes trade off against each 
other (Kazman, Klein, & Clements, 2000, p. 1).   
Within the Systems Engineering Process (SEP), the ATAMSM provides the 
critical requirements loop process, tracing each requirement or quality attribute to 
corresponding functions reflected in the software architectural design.  Whether 
ATAMSM or another analysis technique is used, this critical SEP process must be 
performed to ensure that functional- or object-oriented designs meet all stated, 
derived, and implied warfighter requirements.  In complex systems development 
such as weapon systems, half or more than half of the total software development 
effort will be expended in the architectural design process. Therefore, the DoD PMs 
must ensure that the design is addressing requirements in context and that the 
resulting architecture has a high probability of producing the warfighters’ JCIDS 
stated, derived, or implied requirements. 
The ATAMSM focuses on quality attribute requirements, so it is critical to have 
precise characterizations for each.  To characterize a quality attribute, the following 
questions must be answered: 
 What are the stimuli to which the architecture must respond? 
 What is the measurable or observable manifestation of the quality 
attribute by which its achievement is judged? 
 What are the key architectural decisions that impact achieving the 
attribute requirement? (Kazman et al., 2000, p. 5) 
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The ATAMSM scenarios are a key to providing the necessary information to 
answer the first two questions, driving the software engineer to design the 
architecture to answer the third.  This is a critical point at which all of the MUIRS 
elements need to be considered and appropriate scenarios developed. 
The ATAMSM uses three types of scenarios: Use-case scenarios involve 
typical uses of the system to help understand quality attributes in the operational 
context; growth scenarios involve anticipated design requirements, including 
upgrades, added interfaces supporting SoS development, and other maturity needs; 
and exploratory scenarios involve extreme conditions and system stressors, 
including Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) scenarios (Kazman 
et al., 2000, pp. 13–15).  As depicted in Figure 4, the scenarios build on the basis 
provided in the JCIDS documents and requirements developed through the QAW 
process.  These processes lend themselves to development in an Integrated 
Product Team (IPT) environment led by the user/combat developer and including all 
of the system’s stakeholders.  The IPT products will include a set of scenarios, 
prioritized by the needs of the warfighter for system capability.  The prioritization 
process provides a basis for architecture trade-off analyses.  When fully developed 
and prioritized, the scenarios provide a more complete understanding of 
requirements and quality attributes in context with the operation and support 
(including all of the MUIRS elements) of the system over its life cycle.  A more 
complete understanding of the system’s TOC elements should emerge from this 
type of analysis. 
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Figure 4. QAW & ATAMSM Integration Into Software Life-Cycle Management 
Just as the QAW process provides a methodology supporting RFP,  source-
selection activities, and the Software Specification and System Requirements 
Reviews (SSR and SRR), the ATAMSM provides a methodology supporting design 
analyses, test program activities, and the System Functional and Preliminary Design 
Reviews (SFR and PDR).  The QAW and ATAMSM methodologies are probably not 
the only effective methods supporting software development efforts, but they fit 
particularly well with the DoD’s goals, models, and SEP emphasis.  The user/combat 
developer (blue arrow block in Figure 4) is kept actively involved throughout the 
development process—providing key insights the software developer needs to 
successfully develop warfighter capabilities in a sustainable design for long-term 
effectiveness and suitability.  The system development activities are conducted with 
superior understanding and clarity, reducing scrap and rework, and saving cost and 
schedule.  The technical reviews and audits (part of the DoD overarching SEP) are 
supported with methodologies that enhance both the visibility of the necessary 
development work as well as the progress toward completing it.   
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One of the main goals in analyzing the scenarios is to discover key 
architectural decision points that pose risks for meeting quality requirements.  
Sensitivity points are determined, such as real-time latency performance shortfalls in 
target tracking.  Trade-off points are also examined so that TOC impacts resulting 
from proposed trade-offs can be analyzed. The Software Engineering Institute 
explained, “Trade-off points are the most critical decisions that one can make in an 
architecture, which is why we focus on them so carefully” (Kazman et al., 2000, p. 
23). 
The ATAMSM provides an analysis methodology that complements and 
enhances many of the key DoD acquisition processes.  It provides the requirements 
loop analysis in the SEP, extends the user/stakeholder JCIDS involvement through 
scenario development, provides informed architectural trade-off analyses, and vastly 
improves the software developer’s understanding of the quality requirements in 
context.  Architectural risk is significantly reduced, and the software architecture 
presented at the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) is likely to have a much higher 
probability of meeting the warfighters’ need for capability, including TOC elements. 
Together, the QAW and ATAMSM provide effective tools for addressing 
problem areas common in many DoD software-intensive system developments: 
missing or vaguely articulated performance requirements, significantly 
underestimated software development efforts (resulting in severely underestimated 
schedules and budgets), and poor communication between the software developer 
and the Government (both user and PM).  Both tools provide frameworks for more 
detailed requirements development and more effective communication, but they are 
just tools—by themselves, they will not replace the need for sound planning, 
management techniques, and effort.  Both QAW and ATAMSM provide 
methodologies for executing SEP Requirements Analysis and Requirements Loop 
functions, effective architectural design transition from user to developer, and SEP 
design loop and verification loop functions within the test-case development. 
A significant product resulting from the ATAMSM is the development of test 
cases correlating to the use case, growth, and exploratory scenarios developed and 
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prioritized.  Figure 5 depicts the progression from user-stated capability 
requirements in the JCIDS documents to the ATAMSM scenario development, and 
finally to the corresponding test cases developed.  The linkage to the user 
requirements defined in the JCIDS documents is very strong as those documents 
drive the development of the three types of scenarios, and, in turn, the scenarios 
drive the development of the use cases.  The prioritization of the scenarios from 
user-stated Key Performance Parameters (KPPs), Critical Operational Issues 
(COIs), and FMECA analysis flows to the test cases, helping to create a system test 
program designed to focus on effectiveness and suitability tests—culminating in the 
system Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E).  FMECA is one of the focus areas 
that will have a dynamic impact on TOC analysis because it will help identify 
software components that need higher reliability and back-up capability.  The MUIRS 
focus helps ensure that TOC elements are addressed in design and test. 
 
Figure 5. Capabilities-Based ATAMSM Scenario Development 
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The traceability from user-stated requirements through scenario development 
to test-case development provides a powerful communication and assessment 
methodology.  The growth scenarios and resulting test cases are particularly suited 
for addressing and evaluating TOC design requirements because the system 
evolves over its life cycle, which is often overlooked in current system development 
efforts. 
The software developer’s understanding of the eventual performance required 
in order to be considered successful guides the design of the architecture and every 
step of the software development, coding, and testing through to the Full Operational 
Capability (FOC) delivery and OT&E.  Coding and early testing of software units and 
configuration items is much more purposeful due to this level of understanding.  The 
MUIRS and FMECA focus will help the design process for better TOC performance. 
The resulting test program is very comprehensive as each prioritized scenario 
requires testing or other verification methodologies to demonstrate how the software 
performs in each related scenario and satisfies the quality attributes borne of the 
user requirements.  The testing supports the SEP design loop by verifying that the 
software performs the functions allocated to it and, in aggregate, performs the 
verification loop process by demonstrating that the final product produces the 
capability identified in the user requirements through operational testing. 
Both QAW and ATAMSM require the capturing of essential data supporting 
decision-making and documenting decisions made.  These databases would be best 
used in a collaborative IT system, as described in the next section. 
Collaborative IT Systems 
Collaborative IT tools are being used today in the private sector to connect 
various stakeholders—designers, logisticians, cost analysts, field service 
representatives, system users—who have the need to communicate.  Such tools 
could be used to support current and emerging warfighting systems.  Collaborative 
tools could be adapted to address reliability and ownership cost concerns related to 
warfighting systems.  Tools that facilitate improved communications would likely 
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have immediate payoff in being able to speed up solutions to problems.  For 
example, field service representatives (FSRs) and users could quickly raise 
problems to technical staff for resolution.  Cost analysts could more quickly identify 
emerging cost drivers and initiate business case analyses.  Production and quality 
technicians could rapidly learn of field defects that are the result of production 
defects.  Other FSRs and users could be alerted to emerging problems and be 
armed with advance knowledge that might avert impending failures. 
The reliability improvement process could be enhanced by the use of 
collaborative tools, because of the ease with which LCL professionals could bring 
repair parts databases to bear on design decisions.  This would be helped by 
Pareto, that is, a focus on the cost drivers or reliability drivers, especially the 
expensive items that fail more often than predicted.  This approach could be used 
up-front in pre-acquisition phases, too, by tying in legacy databases that contain 
performance information of similar or predecessor systems.  
Think of the impact to business case analysis (BCA).  Cost estimates depend 
on solid cost databases that are continually updated by current systems in order to 
identify major cost drivers that might be candidates for redesign or improved 
manufacturing processes to achieve better reliability and reduced life-cycle cost.  
Collaborative IT could contribute to the accuracy and completeness of cost 
estimates.  
Component improvements that result from collaborative databases would pay 
off in legacy systems, but might deliver a second payoff in reduced ownership cost 
of future systems as well.  Collaborative databases could be cross-referenced in an 
architecture that would arrange cost and reliability information in system, subsystem, 
or component databases, enabling better cost estimating of emerging systems. 
An example of the potential value of collaborative efforts in improving 
reliability and reducing TOC is the microwave tube on the Aegis program, developed 
in the early 1980s.  The tubes were expensive to maintain (an estimated $8.20 per 
operating hour), ubiquitous (nearly 30,000 units in 2010), and initial reliability 
numbers were lower than expected (as low as 1,300 hours MTBF).  Through a 
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collaborative effort between the program manager, NAVSEA, and several 
commercial vendors, design and manufacturing improvements increased the MTBF 
to 40,000–45,000 hours, drastically reducing the associated TOC from $8.20 to 
$0.45 per operating hour for all associated naval combat systems (Apte & 
Dutkowski, 2006, pp. 3–21). 
Collaborative IT tools could potentially be implemented through apps to smart 
handheld devices, such as iPhones, Androids, or Blackberries.  These devices, 
which are ubiquitous at systems commands and contractor design and logistics 
facilities, could be very valuable and convenient for field service representatives, 
military maintenance personnel, and even users in some environments. 
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Conclusions and Recommendations: Major Thrusts 
to Control Software Component TOC 
Conclusions  
DoD software-intensive systems and the software content in other systems 
will continue to grow and may dominate the TOC costs in the future.  These costs 
are exacerbated by the fact that, in addition to contracted development costs, the 
bulk of the software sustainment costs are also contracted.  In addition, the skill sets 
needed tor software sustainment are the same as for software development, so the 
DoD is contracting for software engineers to perform maintenance functions.  All of 
these factors indicate that DoD system software will continue to be a very expensive 
portion of TOC. 
The software engineering environment remains immature, with few, if any, 
industry-wide standards for software development or sustainment.  The Defense 
Acquisition System (DAS) is significantly dependent on mature engineering 
environments to compensate for the gaps and interpretation requirements presented 
with the performance-based specifications, vague Operational Mission 
Summary/Mission Profiles, and high-level work breakdown structures (WBSs) that 
the DoD provides during the request for proposal (RFP) process. 
The developer software engineers will consume 50% or more of their contract 
resources analyzing requirements and developing the architectural design.  This 
effort is expended before the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) and requirement 
additions (requirements creep), or changes beyond that point have disastrous 
effects on the software design and can even cause a complete redesign at extreme 
cost in funding and schedule. 
The system software size and complexity are key indicators of both the 
development costs and the sustainment costs, so the initial estimates are critical for 
predicting and controlling TOC.  Unfortunately, the software size estimating 
processes require a significant amount of detailed understanding of the 
requirements and design that is typically not available when operating the DAS 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 82 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
without supplementary analyses, tools, and techniques.  Available parametric 
estimating tools require much of the same detailed information and are still too 
inaccurate to be relied upon.  Similarly, understanding the potential software 
complexity requires in-depth understanding of the requirements and architectural 
design. 
It is clear that the DoD must conduct much more thorough requirements 
analyses, provide significantly more detailed operational context, and drive the 
software architectural design well beyond the WBS functional design typically 
provided.  To accomplish this, the DAS must be supplemented with tools, 
techniques, and analyses that are currently not present. 
Recommendations 
Program managers for software-intensive systems must supplement the DAS 
processes to 
• compensate for the immature software engineering environment 
• gain sufficient detailed information to perform reasonable software size and 
complexity estimates critical to understanding and managing system TOC 
• complete the inventory of derived and implied requirements, including the 
often neglected sustainability requirements, before the RFP is issued 
• provide more detailed system operational context, beyond what exists in 
most OMS/MP documents 
• obtain more realistic contractor proposals in terms of cost and schedule 
associated with the software development and sustainment 
• drive the software architecture for a more sustainable, less complex design 
• monitor the software design process (metrics) to ensure the effort is 
progressing towards an effective, supportable, and testable design 
supporting the warfighter 
The tools, techniques, and analyses presented in this research are designed 
to accomplish the tasks outlined above, and are compatible with the Systems 
Engineering Process (SEP) supporting the DAS.  They also are designed to work 
together in a synergistic method to improve the software-intensive system 
development and sustainment performance influencing system TOC.  They are 
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certainly not the only tools, techniques, and analyses available to improve the 
process, and others may be as effective, as long as they can address the bulleted 
items above. 
The maintainability, upgradability, interoperability, reliability, and 
safety/security (MUIRS) analysis technique is designed to help identify derived and 
implied requirements that need to be more fully articulated to ensure that the 
software engineer adequately considers these critical system attributes.  These were 
selected because they are often missing from the user’s capability-based 
requirements documents and the resulting performance specification, yet they are 
critical for the warfighter and are significant TOC drivers. 
The Quality Attribute Workshop (QAW) is a technique to help more fully detail 
all requirements, including derived and implied.  It is often used with the system 
WBS to more fully develop the desired functional design, especially when combined 
with the MUIRS analyses. 
The Architectural Tradeoff Analysis MethodologySM (ATAMSM) is designed to 
be used with the QAW and provides detailed operational context through the 
scenario development, providing critical design cues to the software development 
engineers.  The scenarios include Use Cases (how the system will be used and 
maintained if fielded today), Growth Cases (how the system will likely change over 
its life cycle, including future networking), and Exploratory Scenarios (how the 
system is to operate under unusual or stressful conditions).  This research 
recommends including the MUIRS analyses in the ATAM, as well as Failure Modes 
and Effects Criticality Analyses (FMECA) to identify critical functionality 
requirements. 
Combined, the tools, techniques, and analyses provide a much improved 
understanding of the system and identify critical attributes that the software 
developers need to know to design an effective and supportable design.  These 
tools help compensate for the immature software engineering environment, provide 
more detailed information needed to perform size and complexity estimates, and 
provide detailed operational context needed for proper software architectural design.  
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They help produce superior RFPs and garner more realistic contractor proposals.  
They provide processes for monitoring critical software design activities and full test 
matrix crosswalks.  All of these enhancements will help more accurately estimate 
and manage software TOC attributes. 
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